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 III
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
 
An interest rate policy is symmetrical1 if the nominal interest rate response to equally large 
positive and negative deviations from the inflation target are of identical magnitude but with 
opposite signs. The governor of Norges Bank (NoB, The Norwegian central bank), Svein 
Gjedrem, stated in 1999 that good monetary policy includes a symmetrical interest rate: “Over 
time it is important that the interest rate is set symmetrically. Such symmetry is necessary to 
sustain the expectations of nominal stability” (Gjedrem, 19992).  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 
Figure 1.Norges Bank’s expectation of the sight deposit rate in the baseline scenario with fan chart. Per cent. 
Quarterly figures. 04 Q1 – 08 Q4. Source: Norges Bank, Inflation Report 3/2005.  
 
Norges Bank began its inflation targeting policy about two years after Gjedrem made this 
statement. The governor has not spoken in terms of a symmetrical interest rate during the 
period of inflation targeting. Implicitly however, NoB has communicated a symmetrical 
property of the interest rate by the use of fan charts (see Figure 1). The purpose of the fan 
chart is threefold: it should provide a forecast of the most likely outcome of the economy. The 
most likely outcome is represented by the thick black line at the centre of the projections. 
Second, it should convey the degree of uncertainty surrounding the most likely outcome. The 
degree of uncertainty is represented by the width of the fans. Lastly, it should provide 
information on the balance of this uncertainty.  The spread around the most likely outcome 
should indicate the risks related to the level of uncertainty.  As illustrated in Figure 1, the risks 
                                                 
1 This definition of a symmetrical interest rate is model dependant, as will be illustrated in Section 1.10 
2Author’s own translation of: ”Over tid er det viktig med symmetri i rentesettingen. En slik symmetri er 
nødvendig for å opprettholde tilliten til nominell stabilitet.” (Gjedrem, 1999) 
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of an interest rate lower than the most likely outcome is equal to the risk of an interest rate 
higher than the most likely outcome. The balance of risk is symmetrical.  
 
The optimality of a symmetrical interest rate is based on a simplified model of the economy, 
often referred to as the linear-quadratic framework. There is however reason to question if the 
linear-quadratic framework serves as a good model. If any of the assumptions underlying this 
framework is changed, it will directly impact interest rate setting and a symmetrical interest 
rate is no longer optimal. The expressed view of a symmetrical interest rate makes thus a tight 
restriction on monetary policy.   
 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold: it will demonstrate why the property of a symmetrical 
interest rate / symmetrical fan charts makes a tight restriction on monetary policy. Second, it 
will test if one of the necessary restrictions for a symmetrical interest rate to be optimal can be 
rejected on Norwegian data.  
 
The thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter begins by addressing the questions of what 
monetary policy is, which variables the central bank wants to stabilise and how it can achieve 
its goals by using the interest rate as its instrument. With respect to the change towards 
inflation targeting, the economic rationale when choosing a precise inflation target and a 
production target, is discussed. This discussion makes the foundation of the economic model 
derived at the end of the chapter. The model is based on the linear-quadratic framework. The 
purpose of the first chapter is to illustrate how the linear-quadratic framework leads to an 
optimal symmetrical interest rate. The second chapter questions the symmetrical interest rate 
as an optimal result. It thoroughly analyses how altering some of the assumptions made in 
chapter one impacts the interest rate setting. Specifically, it is the shape of the loss function, 
the shape of the aggregate supply curve, whether shocks are additive only and the credit 
channel that are discussed. The third chapter tests if one of the necessary conditions for a 
symmetrical interest rate to optimal, the linear aggregate supply curve, can be rejected on 
Norwegian data. The supply curve is taken from one of NoB’s economic models. It will be 
shown that linearity of the supply curve cannot be rejected. The supply curve has however 
poor empirical properties, suggesting that the lack of evidence of non-linearity not necessarily 
is evidence of linearity. Another explanation could be that the model is poorly specified. 
Estimation is done using Eviews 5.1. 
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 1
1 OPTIMAL SYMMETRICAL POLICY  
 
1.1 What is monetary policy? 
Monetary policy describes the process of how the government or a central bank manages its 
instrument to achieve specific goals. Such goals can be to stabilise inflation, production, the 
exchange rate, employment, consumption, asset prices or other economic variables that the 
government wants to control. The main instruments that over time have been used in 
achieving these goals are the money supply, open market operations, setting reserve 
requirements, trading in foreign exchange markets and/or the interest rate. NoB’s main 
instrument is the interest rate. (Norges Bank, 2007).  
 
1.2 The transmission mechanism - How the interest rate affects the economy 
Commercial banks have large deposits of assets in NoB. NoB controls the interest rate that it 
gives on these deposits, often termed the key rate. When the NoB raises the key rate, it 
increases commercial bank’s gain from depositing assets. Commercial banks respond by 
increasing their interest rate; the interest rate consumers and businesses pay on their loans, 
and are granted on their deposits. How the interest rate impacts the most important variables 
in the economy, the transmission mechanism, is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
An increase in the interest rate leads to a lowering of production through the raised cost of 
handling debt. In order to meet this increased cost, households reduce their level of 
consumption. When demand and the level of production are lowered, businesses must meet 
this cut in income by reducing its costs. A business can reduce costs by several means: cut in 
staff, cut in wages, lower margins, restructuring, etc. In aggregate, there will be downward 
pressure on employment as a result from the increased interest rate.  
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Figure 2. The Transmission Mechanisms. 3 
 
 
The exchange rate is measured as Norwegian Kroner (NOK) in terms of the foreign currency, 
i.e. kr/£. A reduced exchange rate is thus equivalent to an appreciation of the NOK. When the 
interest rate is raised, investors find it relatively more profitable to buy Norwegian financial 
assets. This leads to an increased demand for NOK, which means that the NOK appreciates. 
In terms of how the exchange rate is valued (kr/£), an increase in the interest rate leads thus to 
a lowering of the exchange rate.  
 
A higher interest rate reduces the level of inflation. The lower level of consumption, the lower 
level of employment and thus the lower level of production, push the rate of inflation down. 
Also, the lowering of the exchange rate, (stronger NOK), meaning that one can buy more 
foreign goods per NOK, also leads to a lower rate of inflation as foreign goods become 
relatively cheaper with the stronger NOK. In addition, the interest rate impacts inflation 
expectations through workers wage demands, which again impact the current level of 
inflation.  
                                                 
3 Inspired by NoB’s illustration from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.norgesbank.no/english/monetary_policy/affect.html 
 
Production 
     
Consumption 
      Investment 
Employment: 
    -Wages 
-Margins
Norges Bank 
key rate 
 
Inflation Market  rates 
Inflation 
Expectations 
Exchange 
Rate (kr/£) 
Imported 
Inflation 
 3
One important conclusion can be reached from the above discussion: The interest rate impacts 
inflation, expected inflation, production, the exchange rate and employment in the same 
direction in the short run (0 – 3 years) i.e. an increase in the interest rate puts downward 
pressure on both production and inflation, and vice versa. This feature has important 
implications on how NoB conducts their monetary policy. Understanding these implications 
requires knowledge of the objective NoB is trying to reach. 
 
1.3 The objective of monetary policy in Norway 
In Norway, the goals of NoB are set by the government. The mandate was changed in March 
2001 when it was decided that the NoB should pursue an inflation target. The target was set to 
2.5 %. In the mandate, the NoB is also instructed to create a stable development of 
production, employment and the value of the NOK (the exchange rate - NOK)4.  
 
Two interesting aspects of this mandate needs further comment. First, Norway is the twenty-
fifth country in the world that has changed its goal of monetary policy towards inflation 
targeting, New Zealand being the first in 1990. The new trend of inflation targeting countries 
is a result of the failure of previous regimes, where one tried to mainly stabilise other 
variables, such as production or the exchange rate.  
 
Second is the amount of variables that is to be stabilised. The mandate specifies that NoB 
should not only focus on a 2.5% inflation rate, but also the development of production, 
employment and the exchange rate. The goal of stabilising more than one variable raises an 
interesting question: What happens if there should be a conflict between stabilising inflation 
and i.e. the level of production? Norway is currently experiencing such a trade-off situation. 
Being hit by a supply shock, the level of production is above trend level, while inflation is 
below its target of 2.5%. Since the interest rate impacts production and inflation in the same 
direction, both variables cannot be stabilised easily. Increasing the interest rate would dampen 
the level of production, pushing it towards the trend level. However, an increased interest rate 
would also dampen the level of inflation, moving it even further away from its target level.  
 
The government has not directed the NoB on how to respond to such offsetting shocks 
through its mandate. The NoB must thus make a judgement of the relative weight it assigns to 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 6.3 for the precise defined mandate  
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stabilising inflation and production. If the central bank were only to focus on stabilising 
inflation, so called strict inflation targeting, the economy would end up creating an 
unnecessary high level of variation in production, which would be sub-optimal with regards to 
the mandate. On the other side, if the NoB solely focused on stabilising the level of 
production, that would create too high a variation in inflation. Somewhere between these two 
extreme policies, lies the optimal policy. It is the relative weight that the NoB assigns to 
stabilising inflation and production that gives the best outcome for the economy. Precisely 
what that relative weight should be is a question NoB is continuously trying to answer.  
 
1.4 Costs related to production 
The total amount of what is produced in a country is measured as Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Norway increased its total amount of production in 2005 with 2.2% from the year 
before.  This type of variation in production happens every year, and economists measure this 
rate of growth with regards to a so called trend level of growth. This trend level is defined as 
the level of growth that is “compatible with a stable development in prices and wages” 
(Bjørnland, 2006, p.6). 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
 
Figure 3. The Output Gap. The official output gap by NoB. Annual series.5 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the output gap. The output gap is the percentage deviation between the 
level of production and the trend level of production6. If the level of growth is above the trend 
                                                 
5 See Appendix 6.1 for a description of the series 
6 Measuring this trend level and the output gap is not a trivial task. According to Orphanides et al., “the 
reliability of output gap estimates in real time tends to be quite low. Different methods give widely different 
estimates of the output gap in real time and often do not even agree on the sign of the gap”  (1999, p.24).   
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level of growth, there is a positive output gap. If the level of growth is however below trend 
level, there is a negative output gap. These variations around the trend level are called 
business cycles and they represent a cost to society, in particular due to employment 
fluctuations7.  
 
1.4.1 Welfare costs of employment fluctuations8 
Production is a direct function of employment. When the level of production varies, the level 
of employment also varies. If there is some element of imperfect competition in the economy 
(which there always will be, the only market that is close to being perfectly competitive is the 
foreign exchange market), there will be welfare costs of employment fluctuations.  
 
    
Figure 4. The Efficient vs. the Imperfect Level of Employment. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the deadweight loss the economy experience if there is imperfect 
competition. The labour market supply curve represents workers marginal rate of substitution 
between work and leisure. The higher the wage paid, the more willing people are to substitute 
leisure for work.  The “demand – efficient” curve represents the amount of workers that firms 
are willing to hire for the different values of the real wage, assuming that firms are operating 
in a perfectly competitive market. Le represents the amount of labour that would be hired in 
such an efficient economy. The “demand – Imperfect” curve represents firms’ demand for 
                                                 
7 A discussion of the welfare costs due to consumption fluctuations can be found in Appendix 6.8 
8 This section is mostly inspired by Sørensen, et al. 2005. p. 601-605 
 
Real wage, 
W/P 
Employment, L 
Demand - Efficient 
Demand - Imperfect 
Supply 
Lm Le
Deadweight loss 
w 
Ll
 6
labour in the case of imperfect competition. Lm is the amount of workers that would be hired 
in an imperfect economy.  
 
If we further assume that there are labour unions operating in this economy, and they have 
demanded a real wage, w, which is higher than the equilibrium real wage, it will create an 
equilibrium level of employment Ll which is even lower than the imperfect level of 
employment. Given the assumptions of imperfect competition and labour unions, Ll is the 
natural rate of employment. The shaded area represents the deadweight loss in the labour 
market. It shows the total amount of inefficiency that prevails due to labour unions and 
monopolistic competition.  
                  
Figure 5. The Welfare Effects of Employment Fluctuations. 
 
Figure 5 illustrate how fluctuations around the natural level of employment cause welfare 
costs in terms of varying levels of deadweight losses. If the economy enjoys a booming 
period, and employment increases to the level of L+, it would be welfare improving since the 
level of employment would move towards the efficient level of employment Le. The total 
welfare gain is represented by the two areas A and B. However, if the economy is going 
through a recession, pushing the level of employment back to L-, it would be welfare 
worsening. The total amount of welfare loss equals the areas C and D. Variation in 
employment, and thus variation in production, is costly to the economy since the welfare gain 
during booms is less than the welfare loss during recessions: BADC +>+ .  
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1.5 Costs of Inflation9  
The costs related to inflation can be divided into three categories. First, there are costs related 
to the variation of inflation. Second, inflation by itself, both positive and negative, incurs a 
cost to the economy. The costs related to positive and negative inflation (deflation) is of such 
different nature that they will be treated separately.  
 
1.5.1 Costs of variation in inflation 
 
• Miscalculations: When i.e. a labour union bargains the wage of its members, it does so 
in nominal terms, making expectations about what price level it believes will prevail 
in the coming period of the wage contract. If the inflation rate turns out to be higher 
than what the union expected, the member workers of that union will suffer a welfare 
loss due to a decreased real wage.  
 
• Redistribution of wealth: A higher than expected inflation rate redistributes wealth 
from creditors to debtors. This is due to how a higher inflation rate means a lower rate 
of real interest. The real interest rate is the real cost of holding money, or in the eyes 
of debtors, it is the cost they must pay to borrow money. If the real interest rate drops, 
so does the cost of their loan.  
 
• Credibility loss: NoB is targeting a certain level of inflation. If inflation varies too 
much around this level, there is a risk that the market will loose faith in the inflation 
target.  
 
1.5.2 Costs of inflation 
• Shoe-leather costs: there are transactions costs related to the handling of money. When 
the inflation rate rises, holding money becomes more expensive, and the frequency of 
transactions will increase.  
 
                                                 
9 The following discussion on the costs related to inflation can be found in any standard macroeconomics book, 
i.e. Sørensen, et al. 2005, Gartner. 2003, Mankiw .2000.  
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• Menu costs:  It is costly for a firm to change prices on its products. An increase in 
inflation forces firms to bear a higher cost related to price changes.  
 
• Relative price distortions: Firm’s change prices at different times. When inflation is 
high, the relative price of goods will differ due to the asynchronous manner in which 
price changes occur. Inflation thus leads to a distortion of consumer choices as firms 
with the same costs charge different prices for their products.  
 
• Loss of competitiveness: For a given nominal exchange rate, a higher level of inflation 
leads to higher wage costs and thus a loss of international competitiveness.  
 
1.5.3 Costs of deflation – liquidity trap 
The economy is in a liquidity trap if it is experiencing deflation (a negative rate of inflation) 
and the level of the interest rate is low. With an already low interest rate, it is difficult for the 
central bank to provide the economy with more liquidity as no lender is willing to lower the 
nominal interest rate below zero. A liquidity trap thus describes a situation where it is difficult 
to stimulate the economy through monetary policy in a situation where such stimulation is 
needed. A liquidity trap could impose huge real costs on the economy as a recession is 
prolonged by the inability of providing economic stimulus.  
 
1.6 Which Stabilisation Levels to Target 
 
1.6.1 Choosing a production target 
Trend level of production is the level that is associated with a stable development of wages 
and prices. It is this level of production which the central bank should target. According to 
Mankiw, one of the most important lessons of macroeconomics is that in the long run, the rate 
of money growth determines the rate of inflation, but it does not affect the rate of production 
(p.529, 2000). If the central bank would try to target a higher level than the trend level of 
production, it would in the long run only lead to a higher level of inflation.  
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1.6.2 Choosing an inflation target 
 
The inflation target in Norway is set to 2.5%. The inflation target should be set as low as 
possible as a low inflation target reduces the costs of inflation (i.e. shoe-leather costs, menu 
costs, relative price distortions, etc). At a zero percent inflation rate, these costs of inflation 
would be non-existent. There is however strong arguments against a zero percent inflation 
target. First, if the inflation target were zero percent, the risk of the economy going into a 
liquidity trap (deflation) would be severe. Second, most economies have the property of so 
called downward nominal wage rigidity. Simplified, this means that employees, and their 
unions, are reluctant to accept a cut in the nominal wage. If inflation is positive, and 
employees accept that their nominal wage is held constant, then they are actually accepting a 
wage cut, in real terms. Some degree of inflation can thus be beneficial, so as to create 
flexibility in the labour market. Third, price indices tend to overstate the true rate of inflation. 
The inflation target in Norway was set to 2.5% so as to accommodate the risks of deflation, 
the impact of downwards nominal rigidity and the problem of price indices overestimating 
inflation10.  
 
1.7 The Loss Function 
The discussion has so far been on an intuitive level, trying to answer some of the more basic 
questions related to monetary policy: what it is, how it affects the economy, what variables to 
stabilise, etc. In deriving what economists call an optimal monetary policy, that is, the 
monetary policy which is best for the economy, a mathematical model is needed. The rest of 
chapter 1 is devoted to developing such a model. The starting point of the model is to use 
some of the results from the discussion so far, and make a mathematical expression describing 
the preferences of the central bank – the loss function.  
 
The previous discussion was related to the welfare costs of variation in production and 
inflation, and what the desired level of production and inflation should be. The main two 
conclusions from that discussion can be used to derive a loss function for NoB: 
 
1. NoB is trying to stabilise production, ty , around its trend level, ty . There is a welfare 
loss related to variation in production around this level.  
                                                 
10 A more thorough analysis can be found in Appendix 6.10 
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2. NoB has chosen an inflation target of 2.5%. In making a general loss function, the 
inflation target will be described byπ . There is a welfare loss when inflation, tπ , 
varies  around its target.  
 
Based on these two characteristics a natural loss function for one period would thus be11: 
 
                  22 )()( ππλ −+−= tttt yyL                     (1) 
 
The subscript t denotes that it is the loss incurred in period t. The first term 2)( yyt −  gives the 
variation in production around its trend value. As the variables are expressed in natural 
logarithms the term yyt −  expresses the percentage deviation from trend. The second term 
2)( ππ −t expresses variation in inflation around the inflation target. Since inflation is 
measured in percent, the term ππ −t  expresses the percentage point deviation off target. λ  
represents the relative weight NoB puts on stabilising production versus inflation, i.e. a high 
λ  means that the NoB puts a large relative weight on stabilising production.  
 
Figure 6 illustrates how this loss function looks like when drawn inπ , y  space. The different 
curves shows different levels of loss based on the same value of λ . If the economy is on 
target, both with regards to inflation and production, there is no social loss (L=0). The L=1 
curve represents all the values of inflation and production that according the loss function 
gives a total loss of 1 unit. The loss function defines an ellipse. This is due to the relative 
weight assigned to λ , where the loss functions are drawn based on the assumption that the 
NoB “feels” a greater loss due to inflation variation than production variation (0<λ <1). This 
assumption is realistic for economies with an inflation target. As described above, the loss 
function holds a property which is of great importance in terms of a symmetrical interest rate: 
  
                                                 
11Since the economy adjusts gradually, the total loss should take into account also the discounted expected future 
losses, so that the total loss becomes: ττ
τδ +
∞
=
∑ tt LE
0
. See Svensson (2004) for a more detailed exposition.  
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Figure 6. The Loss Function. 
 
 
KEY ASSUMPTION 1: The loss function (1) has the property of being symmetrical, 
meaning that a positive or negative deviation of equal size creates the same level of loss.   
 
According to the governor of NoB, Mr. Svein Gjedrem, this is a property that fits well with 
the preferences of all inflation targeting countries: “all inflation targeting countries has the 
property of symmetry in common: avoiding too low inflation is equally important as avoiding 
too high inflation” (2005)12. Mr. Gjedrem is referring to the property of symmetry in inflation. 
In addition, the loss function above is also symmetrical in production. Avoiding too low 
production is thus equally important as avoiding too high production.  
 
The symmetry discussed above is often referred to as symmetry of preferences. This is 
because the loss function is a set of preferences for the central bank, and it is symmetrical 
with regards to both inflation and production. The main question of this thesis is concerned 
with another type of symmetry: the symmetry of the optimal policy. How a set of preferences 
for the central bank, the loss function, leads to an optimal policy, is the topic of the next two 
sections.  
 
                                                 
12 Authors own translation of: ”Men felles for alle land med inflasjonsmålstyring er at det er symmetri: Det er 
like viktig å unngå for lav som for høy inflasjon.” (Gjedrem, 2005) 
L = 1
ty
L = 3
tπ (2.5%) 
L = 0 
ty  
tπ  
 12
1.8 A Model of the Economy: AS-AD  
This section will explain two equations that represent the aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply side of the economy. The analysis will focus on the variables inflation and production 
only. Employment (unemployment) is thus assumed to be a direct function of production. 
This is in accordance with Okun’s law which states that “deviations of income from its 
potential level are proportional to the difference between the actual and the natural 
unemployment rate” (Gartner, 2003, p.402). It is also assumed that the economy is closed, 
which is why the exchange rate is excluded from the analysis. These simplifications are made 
so as to make the exposition of an optimal symmetrical policy as intuitive and clear as 
possible.  
 
1.8.1 Aggregate Supply (AS) 
 
    tttt uyy +−+= − )(1 αππ                    (2) 
 
Equation 2 represents the short run aggregate supply side of the economy (AS). It specifies 
how inflation, tπ , is determined by the level of production and by the expected level of 
inflation. Expectations are assumed to be adaptive. The expected level of inflation is thus 
equal to the inflation level in the previous period, 1−tπ .13 )( yyt −  is the output gap in percent. 
α is a positive coefficient, meaning that the output gap is positively related with inflation - a 
positive output gap will put upward pressure on inflation, and vice versa. α is also known as 
the inflation-production trade-off. More precisely, the slope of the AS curve indicates that it 
takes a 1 percent reduction in output to reduce inflation by α percentage points.  Two 
important key assumptions follows from this discussion: 
 
KEY ASSUMPTION 2: The AS curve is linear, meaning that the inflation-production trade 
off is constant for all levels of production.  
 
                                                 
13 The formation of expectations is simplified in this model. The model used by NoB, which will be analysed in 
Chapter 3, is based on a more complex formation of expectations.  
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tu  are the shocks that hits the supply side of the economy
14. These shocks can be shocks to 
the oil price, labour market, capital market, etc. The figure below shows the aggregate supply 
curve, and how such shocks impact this curve when drawn in ty , tπ  space.  
 
KEY ASSUMPTION 3: The economy is hit by additive shocks only.  Additive shocks 
serves in contrast to i.e. multiplicative shocks, which impacts the slope of the curve in 
addition to the intercept.  
 
                   
 
Figure 7. Aggregate Supply. 
 
 
A higher oil price will increase the general price level (AS (-)) since oil is an important 
component in the production of many goods. When the price of oil increases, so does the 
production costs, and that will put upward pressure on the general price of products in the 
economy. A sudden decrease of labour costs, which could be caused by higher competition 
from Eastern Europe due to greater labour mobility, would have the opposite effect, pushing 
production costs down. This would in the end decrease the general price level of goods in the 
economy (AS (+)). These examples illustrates how shocks to the supply side of the economy 
impacts the AS curve in our model. Understanding how these shocks impact the whole 
economy requires an introduction to the demand side of the economy.  
 
                                                 
14 Such shocks are often assumed identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and constant 
variance. 
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1.8.2 Aggregate Demand (AD) 
 
   tttt viyy +−−=− − )( 1πϕ                                                   (3) 
 
Equation (3) represents the aggregate demand side of the economy. More precisely, it shows 
the equilibrium between the money market and the goods market. )( yyt − is the output gap in 
percent. ti  represents the instrument that the central bank can control; the nominal interest 
rate. An increase in the interest rate, nominal or real ( 1−− tti π )15, leads to a lowering of the 
output gap, all other things equal. This aspect of the model is thus in accordance with the 
previous discussion of the transmission mechanisms in the economy. ϕ represents the interest 
rate sensitivity of production, i.e. the percentage decrease in the output gap as a response to a 
percentage point increase in the nominal interest rate. 
 
KEY ASSUMPTION 4:  The impact of the interest rate on aggregate demand is 
symmetrical, meaning that the interest rate sensitivity of production is equal in absolute 
terms, ϕ , regardless of whether the interest rate is raised or lowered.  
 
tv  represents the shocks do the demand side of the economy such as a change in government 
purchases, a change in taxes or a change in how consumers or business view the future.   
 
With reference to how the interest rate affects inflation from the discussion of the 
transmission mechanism, lets assume that the central bank increase the interest rate when 
inflation is above target, and decrease the interest rate when inflation is below target. This can 
be specified by the following interest rate rule:  
 
        )(1 ππκπ −+= − ttti                κ<0  
 
κ  represents how forcefully the central bank reacts to inflation deviations around the target, 
π . The higher the value of κ , the more forcefully the interest rate will change as a response 
                                                 
15 Following the assumption of adaptive expectations in the expression of the real interest rate ettt ir π−=  
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to a change in inflation.  Using this interest rate rule in the demand function, gives the 
following aggregate demand relationship, as a function of inflation and production: 
 
                   ttt vyy ββππ +−−= )(            )(1 ϕκβ −=               (4) 
 
The aggregate demand curve slopes downward due to the interest rate response from the 
central bank. The higher the value of κ , the lower the value of β , and the flatter the demand 
curve.  The next section seeks to explain how the central bank can control the total outcome 
of the economy by how it responds to inflation rate changes, put differently, by which value it 
assigns to κ .     
 
Figure 8. Aggregate Demand 
 
1.8.3 The AS-AD Equilibrium 
Together, the supply and the demand curves give the complete model for the economy (Figure 
9). The intersection between aggregate supply and aggregate demand (AS=AD) represents the 
stable equilibrium of the economy (A). It is where production is at its natural level and where 
the inflation level is at its target.  
 
Figure 9 shows how a positive supply shock, i.e. an increase in the oil price, puts upward 
pressure on inflation, making the AS curve shift upwards (AS (-)).  The new equilibrium (B), 
when the central bank follows the interest rate rule, is at a point where inflation is higher than 
the inflation target and where production is lower than the natural level. If the central bank 
ty
AD 
ty  
tπ  
π (2.5%) 
β  
1 
 16
would like to change the point of equilibrium, it could assign a different weight to how it 
responds to inflation changes in its interest rate rule by changing the value of κ . 
 
 
Figure 9. The AS – AD Equilibrium 
 
Figure 10 illustrates how different interest rate rules, depending on how forcefully the central 
bank wants to react to inflation rate changes, impact the equilibrium position of the economy. 
The figure also describes the offsetting effects of supply shocks. This was already mentioned 
in the discussion of the mandate given by the government. Here the focus is how the AS-AD 
model can describe the trade-off effect of supply shocks. 
 
       
Figure 10. AS – AD: Altering the Interest Rate Rule 
 
Let’s assume that the central bank would like to react more forcefully to inflation rate 
changes, by assigning a higher value toκ . Given the same supply shock, the new interest rate 
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rule would create a new equilibrium (C). This equilibrium would, compared to the previous 
equilibrium (B), be at a lower inflation rate and at a lower rate of production. This illustrates 
the offsetting property of supply shocks. If the central bank reacts more forcefully to inflation 
changes (high κ ), it manages to keep inflation lower, and closer to its target, but is also drives 
production down, moving it even further away from its natural rate. The opposite would occur 
if the central bank would put more emphasis on stabilising production, assigning a low value 
toκ , which would create another equilibrium point (D). Such an interest rate rule would move 
production closer to the natural rate but it would also move inflation further away from its 
target level, relatively to the other equilibrium point (C).  
 
Two important conclusions should be pointed out from this discussion. First, the central bank 
can, by changing its interest rate rule, choose where it wants the economy to equilibrate along 
the AS curve. Second, supply shocks are offsetting since the central bank faces a trade-off 
between stabilising production and inflation when deciding on its interest rate rule. When the 
economy is hit by such offsetting supply shocks, the central bank must make a choice of what 
it believes to be best for the economy. What that choice should be, and how to find the 
optimal interest rate rule that ensures that the best outcome of the economy is reached, is the 
topic of the next section. 
 
1.9 The Optimal Policy 
”In its most general form an economical optimal policy is characterized as an optimal choice 
among alternative feasible time paths in transforming the economy from a given initial state 
to a desired final state at the end of the planning horizon.” (Kumar, 1969, p. 600). This 
definition of optimal policy is easy to apply to our model, by combining the preferences of the 
central bank with the AS-AD model of the economy. This is done in Figure 11: 
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Figure 11. Optimal Policy 
 
Figure 11 shows how the economy is affected when hit by a negative supply shock (B) 
(“negative” refers to how the shock impacts the level of production). The negative supply 
shock creates a total loss of L1 units. The central bank, can by changing the interest rate rule, 
“turn” the AD curve, and create a new equilibrium with a lower loss, L2, at point O. The loss 
is lower since the loss function that goes through point O is smaller than the loss function that 
goes through point B. Point O is not only better than point B, but in this situation it is also 
optimal. This is due to the fact that the loss function has the same slope as the AS curve at 
point O. The loss function is thus tangent to the AS curve. If the loss function would be 
further reduced, it would not “touch” the AS curve, and such a situation would not be feasible. 
The optimal policy is thus to reduce the level of loss as much as possible given a state of the 
economy (represented by the aggregate supply curve (AS (-)).  
 
In deriving the point of optimal policy we are not taking into account whatever shocks that 
might impact the demand side of the economy.  This is due to how the central bank controls 
the demand side, and not the supply side. It must take the supply side as given. Whatever 
shocks that might hit the demand side, it can be accounted for in the interest rate setting. Since 
the point of optimal policy can be deduced without taking the demand side into account, all 
points that are optimal, given all types of shocks hitting the supply side, can easily be 
deduced. Figure 12 illustrates how all these optimal points make a straight line in ty , tπ  space.  
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Figure 12. The Optimal AD-curve 
 
The slope of the optimal policy condition is given by the slope of the AS curve and the 
relative weight the central bank assigns to stabilising inflation and production. This result is 
given from the mathematical problem of minimising the loss function with respect to the AS 
function16: 
    )( yytt −−= α
λππ                                                    (5) 
 
This is the function of the optimal policy line. It can also be interpreted as the aggregate 
demand curve of the economy when the central bank follows an optimal interest rate rule17. 
Its slope depends on the relative weight of stabilising output vs. inflation, λ , and the slope of 
the aggregate supply curve,α .This result is intuitive. If a high weight is attached to stabilising 
production ( λ is high), and there is a negative supply shock, it is thus optimal with a relatively 
high level of inflation and a small level of the output gap.  
 
The interest rate that ensures that the point of optimal policy is reached is the optimal interest 
rate rule. It is given by inserting the optimality condition into the AD curve (as a function of 
the nominal interest rate), solving for ti .  
 
tttt vi ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+= − ϕππϕλ
απ 1)(1                                           (6)    
                                                 
16 The full calculation of this problem can be found in Appendix 6.4 
17 This is Røisland og Sveen’s interpretation in their article: “Pengepolitkk under et inflasjonsmål”. They present 
a similar model, and their article makes an excellent reference  
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Three important aspects of this optimal interest rate should be noted. First, if there is a shock 
to aggregate demand, tv , the interest rate should be set so as to neutralise the shock 
completely18. This is optimal as there is no trade-off between stabilising output and inflation 
due to demand shocks. 
  
Second, the coefficient in front of the inflation gap shows how forcefully the interest rate 
should respond to different economic situations. The interest rate response is thus dependant 
on the slope of the AS curve, α , the interest elasticity of demand, ϕ , and the relative weight 
put on output .vs. inflation stabilisation, λ .  In our model, all of these variables are fixed and 
the coefficient is thus a constant. This leads us to the third and most important feature of the 
optimal interest rate: given the slopes of the AD and AS curves, and given the relative weight 
attached to the loss function, the optimal interest rate is symmetrical.  
 
1.10 The Symmetry of the Optimal Interest Rate Policy 
 
       
Figure 13. Symmetrical Interest Rate Policy 
 
The property of symmetry in the optimal interest rate is easier appreciated when assuming 
that the inflation gap coefficient is 0.5, that there are no shocks to the demand side, and the 
inflation target is set to 2%. The optimal interest rate thus becomes:  
 
                                                 
18 This is easily seen by inserting the optimal interest rate back into the AD curve, which of course gives the 
optimal policy line 
π  
ti  
        Optimal Interest Rate Policy  
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 21
15.1 −= tti π                                                                 (7) 
 
This optimal interest rate condition makes a straight line in ti , tπ  space, as illustrated in Figure 
13. The optimal interest rate is 2% when the economy is at its long run equilibrium and 
inflation is at its target, (no shocks to either side of the economy). This is the policy neutral 
interest rate. When there are shocks hitting the economy, the optimal interest rate is 
symmetric around this value. If the inflation rate is 3%, which is one percentage point above 
target, the optimal nominal interest rate should thus be 3.5%. If the inflation rate is 1%, which 
is one percentage point below target, the optimal nominal interest rate should thus be 0.5%.  
Since the 3.5% and 0.5% interest rate both deviates 1.5 percentage points from the policy 
neutral rate, they are thus symmetrical. This leads us to a somewhat more precise definition of 
what symmetrical optimal policy setting really is:  
 
Definition19: An optimal interest rate policy is symmetrical if the nominal interest rate 
response to equally large positive and negative deviations from the inflation target, are of 
identical magnitude but with opposite signs.  
 
1.11 Conclusion 
The model developed in chapter 1 will be referred to as the linear-quadratic model20. The 
linear-quadratic model has illustrated how a symmetrical interest rate can be an optimal 
policy. Before inflation targeting was introduced, NoB expressed that such symmetric interest 
rate setting was optimal:  “over time it is important that the interest rate is set symmetrically. 
Such symmetry is necessary to sustain the expectations of nominal stability” (Gjedrem, 
199921). Currently they are expressing symmetry of interest rate setting by the use of 
symmetrical fan charts, as illustrated in Figure 14. According to NoB, it is equally likely that 
any given shock to the economy will push the interest rate higher than the expected path as if 
it will push the interest rate lower than the expected path.   
                                                 
19 This definition cannot be generalised. A symmetrical interest rate should be symmetrical with respect to all 
variables it is trying to stabilise. The above definition refers to symmetry of inflation only. Implicitly however, 
due to the structure of the linear-quadratic model, symmetry with respect to inflation leads also to symmetry of 
production.  
20 Linear refers to the economy (AS-AD) and quadratic refers to preferences (the loss function) 
21Authors own translation of: ”Over tid er det viktig med symmetri i rentesettingen. En slik symmetri er 
nødvendig for å opprettholde tilliten til nominell stabilitet.” (Gjedrem, 1999) 
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Figure 14. Norges Bank’s expectation of the sight deposit rate in the baseline scenario with fan chart. Per 
cent. Quarterly figures. 04 Q1 – 08 Q4. Source: Norges Bank, Inflation Report 3/2005.  
 
The linear-quadratic model developed in this chapter illustrated how such shocks, hitting 
either the demand or the supply side of the economy, indeed provides such a symmetric 
response. Given that the linear-quadratic model is a good model of the economy, it is easy to 
understand NoB in their symmetrical policy setting. There is however reason to question if the 
model developed so far is a good model. The next chapter is devoted to discussing how 
altering the key assumptions will impact the optimal interest rate setting. It will be shown that 
the optimality of symmetrical policy making should represent the exception, rather than the 
rule.  
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2 ASYMMETRICAL POLICY AS AN OPTIMAL RESULT  
 
A robust result is one that still holds if some assumptions of the model are changed. This 
section questions the robustness of the symmetrical optimal policy result. I will systematically 
go through the implications of changing the four key assumptions made so far: the specific 
symmetrical shape of the loss function, the linear aggregate supply curve, that all shocks are 
additive only and the assumption that there is no credit channel.  
 
2.1 Key Assumption 1: Asymmetries in the Loss Function 
The loss function we have looked at so far has the property of being symmetrical. It was 
chosen for two reasons. First, this type of function has become a standard framework in the 
economic literature to represent central banks’ preferences. Second, its symmetrical property 
is in accordance with the expressed preferences of NoB.  
 
In contrast to human preferences, which not always need to be justified, nor consistent, the 
preferences of a central bank should be based on sound economic principles. In chapter 1, 
care was taken in explaining the economic principles underlying the variables (production and 
inflation) that are included in the loss function. That the interaction between these variables 
was symmetrical is a property that was assumed to be optimal, without further discussion.  
According to Alan Blinder, the former Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the 
symmetrical property should be given a closer look: “academic macroeconomists tend to use 
quadratic loss functions for reason of mathematical convenience, without thinking much 
about their substantive implications. The assumption is not innocuous. …. practical central 
bankers and academics would benefit from more serious thinking about the functional form of 
the loss function” (Blinder, 1997, p.6). This section intends to examine the “serious thinking” 
of economists related to the functional form of the loss function. Economic literature can in 
this respect be divided into two categories; preference asymmetry of inflation and preference 
asymmetry of production. 
 
2.1.1 Preference Asymmetry of Inflation 
Is it just as good to be five minutes early when catching a train, as five minutes late? This 
question, a standard analogy to monetary policy, describes a situation where preferences 
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obviously not are symmetric. With an inflation target of 2.5%, and a symmetrical loss 
function, one would think that it is just as good that a shock pushes the economy three 
percentage points upwards to a 5.5% inflation rate, as if a shock would push it three 
percentage points downwards to a 0.5% rate of deflation (-0.5% inflation). But with the 
extreme costs to society due to deflationary pressures, should one be indifferent between these 
two scenarios?  
 
Karagedikli and Lees, two economists at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, believes that 
there is room for asymmetry in the loss function: “There is no particular reason to suppose 
that the costs of below target inflation are of the same magnitude as the costs of above target 
inflation. Policymakers could form a coherent argument in favour of asymmetric preferences 
based on the literature on the costs of inflation” (2004, p.7).  
 
Nobay and Peel modelled such asymmetric preferences using a linex loss function (2003)22. 
This type of loss function was first introduced by Varian in 1975, and further discussed by 
Zellner (1986). Nobay and Peel’s article however, seems to be the first reference when it 
comes to modelling preference asymmetry of inflation within a monetary policy framework.  
The loss function they used was of the form23: 
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This type of loss function deserves a closer look as it quite neatly can be used to test the 
hypothesis of asymmetric preferences.β is a constant describing preferences of inflation 
relative to its target. If β >0, the central bank believes that inflation above target is more 
costly than inflation below target, and vice versa. The linex function has thus the property that 
preferences are symmetric if β approaches zero. More precisely, the linex function becomes 
the symmetric loss function, introduced in equation (1), when β approaches zero24.  
 
                                                 
22 Ruge-Murcia (2001) makes a reference to the mimeo of this article from 1998 
23 The precise loss function used by Nobay and Peel were:
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This property allows researchers to test the symmetry of central banks’ preferences by 
checking if β  is significantly different from zero. Ruge-Murcia tests this hypothesis on the 
three inflation targeting countries Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom and he finds 
“limited but encouraging support for notion of asymmetric preferences” (2003, p27).  
 
Dolado, Dolores and Ruge-Murcia test the linex function on U.S. data, comparing the Burns-
Miller (pre-1979) and Volcker-Greenspan (post -1982) regimes at the U.S. Federal Reserve. 
They find that “the Fed’s inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime appear 
to be asymmetric, in the sense that positive inflation deviations from its target are weighted 
more heavily than negative ones, even if they are of the same magnitude. In contrast, it is not 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of quadratic inflation preferences during the Burns-
Miller regime” (2004, p.17).  
 
The main question this thesis is concerned with is how such a change of preferences impact 
the optimal interest rate policy. With this type of loss function, the optimal interest rate in the 
AS-AD model is given by25: 
 
  ttt vei t ⎟⎟⎠
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It might not be straightforward to see how this optimal interest rate is asymmetric. This 
property is easier appreciated when the optimal interest rate is illustrated as a function of 
inflation, as can bee seen by Figure 15. 
 
 
                                                 
25 The full calculation of this problem can be found in Appendix 6.5 
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Figure 15. Asymmetrical Interest Rate Policy. - Preference Asymmetry of Inflation.  Inflation above target is 
assumed worse than inflation below target, i.e.β >0.  
 
An interest rate response was defined to be symmetric, in our simplified model, if the nominal 
interest rate response to equally large positive and negative deviations from the inflation 
target, are of identical magnitude but with opposite signs, all other things being equal. This is 
not the case for the optimal interest rate response illustrated in figure 1626. Even though there 
is reason to believe that the different costs to society of inflation deviating from its target 
should lead to preference asymmetry of inflation, most of the literature focus on asymmetry 
related to variation in production.  
 
2.1.2 Preference Asymmetry of Production 
The discussion in section 1.4 provided good reasoning why society experiences a smaller 
welfare gain during expansions than the level of loss experienced during contractions. This 
led to the conclusion that less variation in production is good for society, which again led to a 
loss function which was strictly increasing in variation of production. But if there is a welfare 
gain related to production above trend, why is this not reflected in the loss function of the 
central bank?  A growing number of economists seem to believe that central banks are already 
taking it into account, and they refer to the phenomena as “recession aversion”. Recession 
aversion means that policy makers care more about falls than increases in output, relative to 
                                                 
26 An inflation target of 2% and a policy neutral interest rate of 2% are assumed. If a shock would push the 
inflation rate down to tπ (-) , the optimal response would be to decrease the interest rate with one percentage 
point, to 1%. If however an equally large shock would push the inflation rate up to tπ (+), the optimal response 
would be to increase the interest rate by two percentage points, to 4%. Since these two interest rate responses are 
not of the same absolute value, these responses are not symmetric.  
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the natural level. Cukierman argues that recession aversion is not only caused by strict 
economic welfare arguments, but also by political pressure: “political establishment is more 
sensitive to the costs of recessions than it is content with expansions. Since, in a democratic 
society, independent but accountable central banks are not totally insensitive to the wishes of 
the political establishment some of this asymmetry trickles down into the objective function 
of the central bank as well” (2003, p.546). The loss function Cukierman presents is of a fairly 
simple and somewhat familiar character: 
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If production is below trend, yyt < , the loss function coincides with the symmetrical loss 
function. If however, production is above trend, yyt > , the central bank no longer feels a loss 
related to production. The loss is then given by variation in inflation only. The intuition 
behind this loss function is seen more clearly when drawn inπ , y  space: 
 
 
Figure 16. Preference Asymmetry of Production – Recession Aversion 
 
Figure 16 shows how the loss function coincides with the symmetric loss function when 
production is below trend. When production is above trend, the central bank is indifferent 
between all levels of production, given the level of inflation. In the words of Mr. Mervin 
King, the central bank is thus an “inflation nutter” when production is above trend (King, 
1997). One property of this loss function is important to point out. That a central bank feels 
ty
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differently about recessions and expansions do not mean that it is targeting a higher level of 
production than the natural rate. The central bank is still targeting the natural rate of 
production ( ty )
27. Put differently, the loss function is minimised if inflation is at its target and 
production is at the natural rate. The difference from the symmetrical loss function lies in how 
it responds if production is above or below this natural rate.  
 
Figure 17 illustrates how the central bank responds given the AS-AD framework and the loss 
function given by (11)28. The optimal interest rate policy coincides with the optimal interest 
rate policy derived from symmetrical preferences when inflation is above target. If inflation is 
below target, meaning that the economy is hit by a negative supply shock, then the interest 
rate is set so as to reach the inflation target. The optimal interest rate response is thus not 
symmetrical. It will differ according to the types of shocks that are hitting the economy.   
 
 
Figure 17. Aymmetrical Interest Rate Policy – Recession Aversion 
 
Gerlach tested the recession aversion hypothesis on the U.S. Federal Reserve in the period 
1960:1 – 79:4, and found that it “responded in an asymmetric fashion to output gaps” (2000, 
p.13). He found support for the hypothesis that central banks did show recession aversion 
before 1985. 
 
                                                 
27 If the central bank were not targeting the natural rate of production, an inflation bias would arise. This result is 
based on the seminal papers by Kydland and Prescott, and Barro and Gordon. The most important hypothesis 
Cukierman presents in his paper is that an inflation bias will occur if there are asymmetric preferences, even 
when the central bank is targeting the natural rate of production 
28 Calculation of the optimal interest rate policy given recession aversion can be found in appendix 6.6.  
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2.1.3 Conclusion 
One important conclusion can be reached from the above discussion: Preferences that are 
asymmetric, either with respect to inflation or production, leads to an asymmetrical interest 
rate setting, everything else equal.  
 
Even though there are strong economic arguments in favour of asymmetrical preferences, 
such preferences might be too complicated to be operational. According to Svensson, the 
symmetrical loss function should be chosen due to its simplifying character: “some 
researchers have argued that asymmetric preferences are relevant in monetary policy and also 
examined their implications. This would require a more complex loss function. Put 
differently, a second-order approximation is not enough, and higher-order terms are needed. I 
find a symmetric loss function for monetary policy very intuitive, especially since these days 
not only too high inflation but also too low inflation is considered undesirable due to the risk 
of falling into liquidity traps and deflationary spirals… Furthermore, more complex loss 
functions and more complicated tradeoffs may be too sophisticated to be both operational and 
sufficiently verifiable for reasonable accountability” (Svensson, 2002, p. 279). 
 
Bearing in mind how NoB has explicitly and repeatedly expressed a symmetrical character of 
their preferences, the symmetrical loss function will be used in the remaining analysis. 
 
2.2 Key Assumption 2: The Non-linear AS curve 
In the models used so far, it has been assumed that the AS curve was of a linear form. The 
slope of the AS curve,α , was introduced as the parameter describing the inflation – 
production trade-off, without much further explanation. This trade-off describes an important 
economic mechanism, and the issue deserves further attention.  
 
The main reason that drives the trade-off is price stickiness. This can easily be illustrated by 
how labour unions negotiate wage contracts. These contracts last for one year in Norway. In 
the United States, the average contract time is about three years. When the union negotiates 
the contracts, and since they are interested in achieving as high a real wage as possible, they 
must take into account the price level that will prevail in the period of the wage contract. Let’s 
assume that in the middle of such a wage contract period, the level of inflation unexpectedly 
jumps. Since the wage contract is negotiated in nominal terms, the unexpected rise in inflation 
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effectively lowers the real wage. From the firms’ perspective, this means that labour is 
cheaper. Taking advantage of the lower price, firms higher more labour, which again leads to 
a higher production of goods and services. This explains the inflation-production trade-off. 
The linear AS curve however, relies upon the assumption that the inflation-production trade-
off is constant for all levels of production. It does not matter at which level of production the 
economy is at, the trade-off the central bank is facing between inflation and production in 
booming periods is thus the same as the trade-off it is facing during recessions.  
 
The purpose of this section is to question the assumption that the AS curve is linear. A non-
linear AS curve means that the inflation-production trade-off is not constant for all levels of 
production. The discussion will focus on the convex AS curve.  
 
The AS curve is defined to be convex if there is a positive trade-off between inflation and 
production, and if this trade-off is increasing with the level of production29.  This is illustrated 
in Figure 18: 
 
Figure 18. A Convex AS Curve 
 
The main theoretical argument underlying the convex AS curve is due to capacity constraints. 
When the economy is experiencing a boom, and when production is close to its capacity limit, 
an increase in demand will mostly impact the level of inflation. An aggregate supply curve 
describing the property of capacity constraint could be represented by the following function: 
                                                 
29 More formally: yy ∂∂<<∂∂ ππ 022 . Notice how this definition differs from the definition of a convex  
curve: yy ∂∂≤≤∂∂ ππ 022 . This is done so that the linear curve does encapsulate the definition of convex.  
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     ttttt uyyy ++−+= − 21 )( ηαππ                                        (12) 
 
The quadratic term of production is what makes this supply curve differ from the linear 
supply curve. The coefficient of this quadratic term,η , represents the degree to which the 
trade-off between inflation and production is increasing as production increases. The function 
becomes the linear supply curve if η =0.  
 
If the economy is described by such a supply curve, the central bank’s optimal interest rate 
rule is given by30 equation 13.  The term in front of the inflation gap is dependant on the level 
of production. Since in our model, the level of production is uniquely determined by the level 
of inflation (a quadratic relationship), the interest rate respond is thus asymmetrically with 
respect to deviations from the inflation target. 
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The asymmetrical response is easier appreciated when considering the AS-AD model. For 
illustration purposes, we assume the extreme case when the central bank is an “inflation 
nutter”, setting the interest rate so as to stabilise inflation completely. This is illustrated by the 
perfectly horizontal AD curve in the Figure 19. Two shocks to the supply side, of identical 
magnitude but with opposite signs, are illustrated. In terms of production, it is much more 
costly to stabilise inflation during recessions (A), than it is to stabilise inflation during booms 
(B). This is shown by how much production deviates from trend value at the two 
equilibriums. The figure shows thus the general principle of how the costs of supply shocks 
are asymmetrical with a convex AS curve. An optimal interest rate response set to neutralise 
this asymmetry, must consequently also be asymmetrical31.  
                                                 
30 See calculation in Appendix: 6.7 
31 Assuming symmetrical preferences 
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Figure 19. A Convex AS Curve – Asymmetric Costs of Supply Shocks 
 
Many studies have tried to shed light on what the supply schedule looks like in the short run. 
Dolado, et al, looked at the shape of the AS curve in both the U.S. and in the Euro area. They 
could not reject the linear specification for the U.S. market, but in the Euro area (more 
specifically: Germany, France and Spain) they found significant evidence indicating a convex 
AS curve, as illustrated in Figure 20.  
 
 
Figure 20. AS curve in the Euro area. Germany, France and Spain (Dolado, et al., 2003, p.12) 
 
Dolado et al believe that high nominal wage rigidity in the European labour market can 
explain why they found evidence of a convex AS curve in the Euro area. The curve then 
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reflects how workers’ willingness to cut their real wage lowers as production and inflation 
decreases. The more flexible U.S. market would then also explain why they could not find 
evidence of a convex AS curve  in the U.S.  
 
David Turner, an OECD economist, studied the G7 economies32. In contrast to Dolado et al 
findings, he found evidence of a convex AS curve in the United States. Also Japan and 
Canada could better be described by a convex AS curve. Concluding on his results, he pointed 
out that his findings were sensitive to both the model specification and the reliability of output 
gap measurements (Turner, 1995).  
 
Estimation on Norwegian data has mainly been done on the wage curve. The wage curve 
refers to a negative relationship between the real wage and unemployment. Given Okun’s law, 
and a positive relationship between the real wage and inflation, a convex wage curve is 
equivalent to a convex supply function. In his Ph.D. thesis, Johansen (1995) reports of a 
strongly non-linear wage curve based on data from 1964 - 1990. The curve is convex, with a 
large trade-off when unemployment is low, and an almost flat wage curve for employment 
rates above 3 %.  In addition to a nominal wage floor, Johansen mention composition effects 
as a possible cause of convexity. If the ratio of long-term unemployed increases with average 
unemployment, and “if the long-term unemployed exert less downward pressure on wages 
than do the recently laid off workers, the marginal effect from increased average 
unemployment will be decreasing” (Johansen, 1995, p. 10) .  
 
Figure 21. A Concave - Convex AS Curve 
 
                                                 
32 The G7 economies consist of: United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom and Canada 
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The empirical evidence on the shape of the AS curve is however far from conclusive. In the 
literature, there are mostly three different shapes discussed: the convex, the concave and the 
concave-convex. Chapter 3, which constitutes the empirical part of this thesis, will test if the 
linear specification can be rejected on the Norwegian economy. 
 
2.3 Key Assumption 3: Multiplicative Shocks 
 
The optimal interest rate derived from the linear-quadratic model, (equation 6), was based on 
the assumption that the slope of the AS curve,α , did not vary with time. The economy was 
assumed to only be hit by additive shocks. This assumption is strong.  
 
 
Figure 22. Multiplicative Shocks: Shocks that impact the slope of the AS curve 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the slope of the AS curve has changed with time. 
Globalisation seems to be the driving force of this development and it has caused a flattening 
of the AS curve. Figure 22 illustrates how multiplicative shocks, such as globalisation (AS(+)), 
might impact the AS curve. There are three reasons why globalisation has had this effect. 
First, globalisation has led to increased competition and thus lessening the scope of raising 
prices when demand rises. Second, increased trade and investment has made goods prices less 
sensitive towards domestic demand. Third, labour mobility has increased, making also wages 
less sensitive towards domestic demand pressures. (Iakova, 2007) 
 
If the slope of the AS curve changes with time, tα ,  the optimal interest rate is then given by: 
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A varying slope of the AS curve will directly impact the optimal interest rate rule. The 
symmetry of the interest rate is thus directly impacted by how the central bank views the 
properties of the potential shocks that might hit the economy.  
 
2.4 Key Assumption 4: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy 
In the AS-AD model it was assumed that an interest rate increase would impact aggregate 
demand, in absolute terms, by the same amount as an interest rate cut. There are however 
strong arguments in favour of an asymmetric impact on the demands side. Such a property of 
the economy is often viewed in terms of the credit channel of monetary policy, and it is 
illustrated in the figure below.   
 
            
Figure 23. The Financial Accelerator Effect 
 
Figure 23 illustrates how an interest rate cut pushes demand upwards (AD (+)). It also 
illustrates how an interest rate increase impacts demand more than the interest rate cut (AD (-)).  
 
The credit channel of monetary policy is based on a variety of alternative non-monetary 
assets. It serves in contrast to the money view (which was assumed in the main model) where 
all non-money assets are assumed homogenous (bonds).  One often used rationale explaining 
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the asymmetric impact is the financial accelerator effect33. Small firms are particularly 
vulnerable to interest rate increases during recessions. They do not have the same ability as 
large firms to find alternative means of funding, i.e., capital market, internal funding, etc. If 
balance sheets are already low, an interest rate increase will not only increase the value of 
money and thus decrease the level of investment, but it will also lower the value of the 
collateral used by small firms as their source of funding. In turn, this value reduction will 
force these firms to further reduce their investment. According to Walsh; “a rise in the interest 
rates may have a much stronger contractionary impact on the economy if balance sheets are 
already weak, introducing the possibility that nonlinearities in the impact of monetary policy 
may be important” (p.324, 2003).  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This purpose of this chapter was to question the robustness of the symmetrical optimal policy 
result. Changing any of the four key assumptions: the specific symmetrical shape of the loss 
function, the linear aggregate supply curve, that all shocks are additive only and the 
assumption that there is no credit channel, will directly impact the symmetry of monetary 
policy. If any of these assumptions do not hold it is not optimal to set the interest rate 
symmetrically. 
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Figure 24. Market expectations of the sight deposit rate in the baseline scenario with fan chart based on 
interest rate options. Percent. Half-yearly figures. 05 H1 – 08 H2. Based on options prices at 27 October 
2005.Source: Norges Bank, Inflation Report 3/2005.   
 
                                                 
33 See Walsh, chapter 7: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy 
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Figure 24 illustrates uncertainty based on market expectations. In contrast to the symmetrical 
property of the fan charts expressed by NoB (Figure 14), the market does not believe the 
balance of risk to be symmetrical. That market expectations of uncertainty are asymmetrical 
could be due to a more complex view of the economy than the linear-quadratic framework 
given in chapter 1, i.e. if the market believes that the supply curve is non-linear.  
 
 
 
 
.  
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3 TESTING THE LINEARITY OF THE SUPPLY CURVE 
 
The model developed in chapter 1 illustrated how the expressed symmetrical interest rate by 
NoB could be an optimal policy. Chapter 2 questioned this result by loosening some of the 
strong assumptions made in the linear-quadratic model. The purpose of this chapter is to test 
if one of the necessary assumptions of a symmetrical interest rate, the linear supply curve, is 
valid on Norwegian data. The supply curve estimated is taken from one of NoB’s models. The 
empirical attributes of the model will also be discussed.  
 
3.1 Norges Bank’s Calibrated Supply Curve 
As of the third Inflation Report 2005 NoB began publishing the future interest rate path (with 
uncertainty bands) describing the expected levels of the interest rate which Norges Bank finds 
most likely (i.e. Figure 14). This was in contrast to previous interest rate paths which were 
based on market expectations. Developing these new interest rate paths is done by the aid of 
many economic models in addition to judgement concerning the current economic situation. 
The core model used in forecasting the economy and developing interest rate paths is 
commonly known as 1A. The supply side equation (1AS) in that model describes the short 
run trade-off between production and inflation. It is given by: 
 
∑
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tπ , π , tx  , tq  represents inflation, the inflation target, the output gap and the real exchange 
rate respectively. α ’s and β ’s are constants. 4+ttE π  denote the expectation of inflation one 
year ahead (each time period is in quarters). Δ  indicates the change in a variable between two 
time periods. tε  is a stochastic residual.  
 
The inclusion of expected future inflation is a standard representation of New Keynesian 
models. It is normally based on the assumption that agents face restrictions on how often they 
can change prices and that they are forward looking in their price setting behaviour. Model 
1AS differs from New Keynesian models by i.e. the inclusion of lagged inflation and the 
inflation target. Including these terms can be rationalised by assuming that a proportion of the 
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firms will adjust their prices based on both the previous periods’ level of inflation and the 
level of the inflation target. An overriding concern when developing the model was to ensure 
that “the model has a dynamically stable solution” (Husebø et al, 2003, p. 10). The 
coefficients on inflation are thus restricted to sum to unity which implies a vertical long-run 
supply curve.  It should be noted that sufficiency of a dynamically stable solution concerns 
lagged dependant variables.  The inflation target defined by equation 15 is in this respect a 
constant, and its inclusion in the homogeneity restriction does not make a sufficient condition 
for a dynamically stable solution.   
 
Inflation is a function of the output gap. New Keynesian models are based on real marginal 
cost being the driving variable of the inflation process as firms set prices as a mark-up on 
marginal costs. The output gap is used as a measure of marginal cost in 1AS. This is in 
accordance with the standard sticky price framework without variable capital, where there is 
an approximate proportionate relation between marginal cost and the output gap (Gali et al, 
1999).  
 
The inclusion of differenced output gap does not hold strict theoretical underpinnings. 
However, Husebø, et al provides two non New Keynesian rationales why this term is included 
in the supply function: “First, inflation can start to pick up even if the output gap is negative, 
if the output gap is closing fast. Second, given that estimates of the level of the output gap are 
uncertain, having the change in the output gap (which is less sensitive to assumptions) in the 
Phillips Curve make the forecasts for inflation somewhat more robust” (p. 10, 2004).  
 
No theoretical reasoning was given in the model documentation of including the change in the 
real exchange rate. That the change in the real exchange rate should be included can be argued 
through the impact on the overall price level from the price level on imported goods. In model 
1AS, the changes of the real exchange rate are included from lag two to five. According to 
Husebø et al. this specification “matches the model properties to recent empirical research on 
the pass through from exchange rates to prices”.  
 
Model 1AS is calibrated. According to Husebø et al, an overriding concern when calibrating 
the model was to ensure that the parameters obtained was in accordance with economic theory 
and available empirical evidence. The calibrated parameter values are given in Table 1. All 
the calibrated values are between zero and one.  
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 0α  = 0.60 2β   = 0.2   
 
1α  = 0.05 3β  = 0.2  
 
2α  = 0.07 4β   = 0.3  
 
3α  = 0.10 5β   = 0.3  
  4α  = 0.15      
 
Table 1. Calibrated Parameter Values 
 
 
3.2 Generalised Method of Moments 
Estimation follows Nymoen and Tveter 2007 and is done by the method of Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM). There are particularly two properties of model 1AS which 
makes GMM a preferred estimator. Firstly, there is an endogeneity problem in 1AS due to the 
expected future rate of inflation. Secondly, the model holds the property of first-order moving 
average error terms. This autocorrelation property of the model is found by its rational 
expectation solution. The procedure is illustrated in Bårdsen et al, (2005, p. 292)34. This 
section analyses how the GMM estimator deals with these two properties. 
 
Simplifying the notation of 1AS, yields the following expression: 
 
   ttt εβπ += X              Tt …1=                       (16) 
  
tX is a (1×9) matrix representing the explanatory variables, and β is a (9×1) matrix 
representing all coefficients in 1A: 
 
[ ]54321141               1  −−−−−−+− ΔΔΔΔΔ= tttttttttt qqqqxxE ππX  
[ ]54443424321010             )1(    βαβαβαβαααααπααβ −−=′  
 
The endogeneity problem is due to the expectation of future inflation. Modelling expectations 
requires an assumption about how these expectations are realised.  By assuming that expected 
                                                 
34 They assume that the feedback channel of output is a function of its own one period lag. This is in accordance 
with model 1A.   
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future inflation is determined as a function of future inflation and an error term 
( 444 +++ += ttttE υππ ), the level of future inflation becomes endogenous35: 
 
   [ ] 1,90≠ttE εX   Tt …1=      (17) 
 
The endogeneity problem requires the use of an instrumental variable estimator such as the 
GMM. Good instruments, Z , should be uncorrelated with the disturbance term and highly 
correlated with the variable for which it serves as an instrument36. The additional instruments 
used by Nymoen and Tveter are 2−tπ , 1−Δ tq , 6−Δ tq  and 7−Δ tq . Applying this additional set of 
instruments corrects the endogeneity problem as the total set of instruments, tQ , are 
uncorrelated with the residual. The orthogonality condition then follows: 
 
   [ ] [ ] 1,120)( =−= βπε ttttt EE XQQ  Tt …1=     (18) 
 
tQ  is a (12×1) matrix, where each element represents an instrument: 
 
[ ] [ ]tttttttttttttt qqqqqqqxx ZWQ #=ΔΔΔΔΔΔΔΔ=′ −−−−−−−−−−− 76125432111            1  ππ  
 
This total instrument set can be partitioned into two matrices. tW is a (1×8) matrix 
representing the exogenous variables in equation (15) and the constant term. tZ is a (1×4) 
matrix representing the additional instruments used to correct the endogeneity problem.  
 
The empirical mean of the orthogonality condition (18) is given by the  (12×1) vector: 
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The idea underlying the GMM estimator is to choose the value of β  which brings the value of 
Tg as close to its theoretical counterpart, the zero vector 1,120 , as possible (Biorn , 2007).  
 
                                                 
35 See calculation in Appendix 6.8 
36 The set of additional instruments, Z , will be thoroughly discussed in section 3.4 
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If there are more instruments than endogenous explanatory variables, which there are in this 
case, then there are more equations (12) than unknown parameters (9). The equation system is 
overidentified. The GMM estimator resolves this problem by minimising the quadratic 
form TTT gg S' , given by (20), where TS is a (12×12) positive definite weighting matrix: 
 
[ ]TTTGMM gg S'minargˆ =β                                           (20) 
  
The GMM estimator is chosen because it resolved two inherent problems of model 1AS with 
respect to estimation. First, the endogeneity problem is resolved by the use of instrumental 
variables. The second issue of estimation was related to the models predictions of 
autocorrelated error terms. GMM resolves this problem by an appropriate choice of the 
weighting matrix TS . It can be shown that the optimal choice of TS (the most efficient 
estimator) is the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the empirical moment Tg  as 
given by (see Greene p. 206): 
 
{ } 1)(. −= TOPTIMALT gTVarAsyS                                     (21) 
 
3.3 Testing Linearity 
Testing whether the trade-off between inflation and the lagged value of the output gap is 
constant for all levels of the output gap can be done by the following specification: 
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S is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if there is a positive output gap and zero otherwise.  
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δ is a coefficient describing the additional trade-off when the output gap is positive37. Figure 
25 illustrates equation 2 where δ  is negative.  
 
Figure 25. Threshold Model 1 
 
Table 2 provide the estimates of equation 22 using the sample period 1993q1 – 2006q1. None 
of the estimates of the extra effect are significantly different from zero, regardless of inflation 
and output gap measure.  The sign of δˆ  depends on the inflation measure.  This indicates that 
there is little reason to conclude that there is a different trade-off between inflation and 
production in booms and recessions. The formal test of this hypothesis, the t-test, shows that 
δˆ is not significantly different from zero. It should be noted that autocorrelation of order four 
and five is significant38 and that autocorrelation makes the t-test unreliable. The problem of 
autocorrelation will be discussed when analysing the instrument set used.  
 
Non-linearity might arise even though the test of Threshold Model 1 could not reject the 
linear model. This is due to how Threshold Model 1 only holds one cut-off point. If the true 
specification of the supply curve was i.e. concave-convex (see Figure 21), the test statistic 
would not necessarily reject linearity when using Threshold Model 1. Allowing for two cut-
off points, instead of one, could reveal potential non-linear shapes that are not handled by 
Threshold Model 1. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 26 and Figure 27. Two alternative 
specifications, both with two cut-off points, but with different economic interpretations, are 
used.  
                                                 
37 Note on spline regressions: making the function continuous requires in general that one allow the intercept to 
vary for the different segments (Greene,2003,  p.121). Such manipulation is not necessary as the threshold value 
above is zero, making the intercept for both segments equal.  
38 The autocorrelation test is given in Table 7. 
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 CPI  CPI-ATE  CPI-ATED  NB-CAL 
0α   0.446   0.753   0.791  0,600 
 ( 0.171)  ( 0.096)  ( 0.130)   
        
πα1   0.095   0.214   1.940  0,125 
 ( 0.912)  ( 0.103)  ( 1.078)   
        
)1( 10 αα −−   0.326   0.172  -0.538  0,350 
 ( 0.385)  ( 0.116)  ( 0.432)   
        
2α   -0.273   0.065   0.476  0,070 
 ( 0.277)  ( 0.037)  ( 0.243)   
        
3α  -0.722  -0.060  -0.459  0,100 
 ( 0.495)  ( 0.194)  ( 0.558)   
        
24βα  -0.155  -0.005   0.019  0,030 
 ( 0.060)  ( 0.016)  ( 0.020)   
        
34βα  -0.110   0.021   3E-04  0,030 
 ( 0.071)  ( 0.014)  ( 0.039)   
        
44βα   0.083   0.004  -0.002  0,045 
 ( 0.071)  ( 0.014)  ( 0.031)   
        
54βα   0.034   5E-04   0.010  0,045 
 ( 0.029)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.024)   
        
δ   0.552  -0.052  -0.172   
 ( 0.443)  ( 0.085)  ( 0.202)   
2R   0.31   0.90   0.87   
DW  1.77   1.53   0.75   
σ   0.93   0.70   1.00   
JB  0.47   7.33   2.77   
)( Jχ   1.09   2.85   1.85   
 ( 0.78)  ( 0.42)  ( 0.60)   
 
Table 2. 1AS Estimates – Threshold Model 1. Note: GMM estimates for period 1993q1 - 2006q1. Standard 
errors are shown in brackets. No homogeneity restrictions made on the coefficients. The estimated equations 
include two lags of inflation, lagged output gap, lagged change in output gap and seven lags of the change in the 
real exchange rate. CPI, CPI-ATE and CPI-ATED refer to different inflation measures. Software Eviews 5.1.  
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Threshold Model 2 provides the supply curve with two cut off points:  
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1S  and 2S  are dummy variables which takes the value one if the output gap is respectively 
higher than Hx or less than Lx .  
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The above specification allows the slope of the supply curve to vary depending of the value of 
the output gap. This is illustrated in Figure 26. 
 
     
Figure 26. Threshold Model 2      Figure 27. Threshold Model 3 
 
 
Threshold Model 2 is not a continuous function. It makes a “jump” at the break off points as 
the specification force the different line segments to share the same intercept. In terms of 
economic interpretation, Threshold Model 2 allows the testing of slope variation only. The 
discontinuous function also holds the property of a costless change in inflation at the 
threshold values.  
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Figure 27 illustrates the model when the specification is changed so as to make the function 
continuous. Threshold Model 3 allows both the slope and intercept of the different line 
segments to vary.  The specification of Threshold Model 3 is given by:  
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Table 3 provides the Wald test of a non-linear supply curve for both threshold models. The 
linear specification cannot be rejected on any of the models, regardless of where in the 
business cycle the cut-off point is placed.   
 
There is no empirical evidence from either of the Threshold Models supporting a non-linear 
shape of the supply curve in 1AS. This result stands in contrast to previous research on the 
supply side of the Norwegian economy. The lack of empirical support of a non-linear shape 
does however not mean that there is empirical support of a linear shape. It could be that the 
model at hand is a poor model of the Norwegian economy and that estimation is impacted by 
the effect of i.e. omitted variables.  
 
),( HL xx  0.5) , 5.0(−  1) , 1(−  (-1.5 , 1.5) 2) , 2(−  
  F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob. 
         
TM 2  0.08 0.92 0.33 0.72 0.21 0.81 0.78 0.47 
         
TM 3  0.13 0.88 0.26 0.77 0.18 0.84 0.01 0.37 
         
Table 3. Wald Test. TM (Threshold Model) 0   : 210 == δδH . Degrees of freedom: (2 , 39)  
 
 
Nymoen and Tveter 2007 question if 1AS is a suitable model for the Norwegian economy. 
Assessing the empirical validity of the model they conclude that 1AS has low empirical 
foundation: it lacks empirical consistency. The estimated coefficients were very sensitive with 
respect to the period of estimation and they often had the wrong sign (in particular the 
coefficient in front of the change in the output gap, and coefficients in front of the change in 
the log of the real exchange rate). In addition, Nymoen and Tveter found the estimated model 
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to hold significant autocorrelation of order four, in contrast with the predictions of 1AS.  Such 
autocorrelation could stem from an omitted autocorrelated variable.  
 
Two rationales can explain the lack of empirical consistency: either the model at hand is a 
poor (or too simple) model. Alternatively, given the data available, the estimation procedure 
and the model structure, it is not possible to arrive at empirically consistent results. In the 
words of Nymoen and Tveter39: “a direct estimation of the supply side of Norges Bank’s 
model gives estimates far from the calibrated values which Norges Bank believes describe the 
inflation mechanisms in Norway. This can to some extent be due to the model itself. The 
problem of weak identification makes precise estimation difficult. Another interpretation, 
supported by the fact that it has been possible to derive other models which are theoretical 
consistent and realistic, is that 1AS is too simple in describing inflation in Norway” 
 
The purpose of the next sections is to shed light on the difficulty of attaining empirically 
consistent results.  It will analyse how sensitive the estimates are towards choice instrument 
set and time period of estimation.  
 
3.4 Instrument Sensitivity40 
An instrument set is defined by two properties. First, it must be uncorrelated with the error 
term. Second, it must be highly correlated with the variable for which it serves as an 
instrument. A particular instrument set can be tested against both of these criteria.  
 
Testing instrument exogeneity is done by the over-identifying restrictions test, denoted )(Jχ . 
The null hypothesis of this statistic is that the instruments are exogenous. The hypothesis of 
instrument exogeneity could not be rejected in any of the previous regressions. It should be 
noted that this test statistic holds low power.  
                                                 
39 Authors own translation of: “direkte estimering av tilbudssiden I Norges Banks model gir resultater som er 
langt fra de kalibrerte verdiene som Norges Bank anser som dekkende for å beskrive inflasjonsmekanismene i 
Norge. Dette kan i noen grad skyldes at selve modellformen, på grunn av svak identifikasjon unndrar seg presis 
estimering. En annen tolkning, som støttes av at det har vært mulig å oppnå teoretisk konsistente og realistiske  
modeller met et annet utgangspunkt, er at likning (1) er en for enkel modell for inflasjonen i Norge.” 
(Økonomisk Forum, p. 51, Nr. 5 2007) 
40 Sensitivity analysis with respect to the output gap can be found in Appendix 6.2 
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),( HL xx  0.5) , 5.0(−   1) , 1(−   1.5) , 5.1(−   2) , 2(−  
0α   0.738   0.738   0.725   0.740 
 ( 0.109)  ( 0.102)  ( 0.108)  ( 0.101) 
        
πα1   0.239   0.267   0.253   0.266 
 ( 0.114)  ( 0.098)  ( 0.105)  ( 0.111) 
        
)1( 10 αα −−   0.147   0.131   0.157   0.127 
 ( 0.153)  ( 0.134)  ( 0.138)  ( 0.136) 
        
2α    0.054   0.064   0.057   0.056 
 ( 0.033)  ( 0.031)  ( 0.026)  ( 0.025) 
        
3α  -0.096  -0.087  -0.104  -0.100 
 ( 0.235)  ( 0.215)  ( 0.209)  ( 0.206) 
        
24βα  -0.007  -0.005  -0.002  -0.008 
 ( 0.018)  ( 0.014)  ( 0.015)  ( 0.017) 
        
34βα   0.025   0.028   0.024   0.028 
 ( 0.013)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.014) 
        
44βα   0.007   0.006   0.003   0.009 
 ( 0.015)  ( 0.015)  ( 0.016)  ( 0.016) 
        
54βα   0.002  -3E-04  -1E-04   0.002 
 ( 0.013)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.013) 
        
1δ   5E-05  -0.007  -0.012   0.012 
 ( 0.013)  ( 0.017)  ( 0.018)  ( 0.016) 
        
2δ  -0.007  -0.015  -0.010  -0.012 
 ( 0.021)  ( 0.019)  ( 0.022)  ( 0.015) 
2R   0.90   0.90   0.90   0.90 
DW  1.49   1.44   1.45   1.51 
σ   0.70   0.70   0.70   0.70 
JB  9.13   9.95   9.16   11.7 
)( Jχ   3.08   2.83   2.88   3.03 
 ( 0.38)  ( 0.42)  ( 0.41)  ( 0.39) 
Table 4. Threshold Modell 2.  Output Gap: NB , Inflation Measure: CPI-ATE. GMM estimates for period 
1993q1 - 2006q1. Standard errors are shown in brackets. No homogeneity restrictions made on the coefficients.  
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),( HL xx  0.5) , 5.0(−  1) , 1(−   1.5) , 5.1(−   2) , 2(−  
0α   0.571   0.742   0.722   0.715 
 ( 0.108)  ( 0.109)  ( 0.119)  ( 0.128) 
        
πα1   0.326   0.253   0.245   0.245 
 ( 0.896)  ( 0.099)  ( 0.116)  ( 0.117) 
        
)1( 10 αα −−   0.280   0.137   0.163   0.171 
 ( 0.383)  ( 0.143)  ( 0.158)  ( 0.164) 
        
2α    0.073   0.057   0.050   0.049 
 ( 0.107)  ( 0.028)  ( 0.024)  ( 0.026) 
        
3α  -0.340  -0.086  -0.115  -0.128 
 ( 0.492)  ( 0.224)  ( 0.222)  ( 0.234) 
        
24βα  -0.162  -0.005  -0.002  -0.005 
 ( 0.051)  ( 0.014)  ( 0.015)  ( 0.017) 
        
34βα  -0.062   0.026   0.024   0.025 
 ( 0.050)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.014)  ( 0.014) 
        
44βα   0.089   0.005   0.003   0.005 
 ( 0.068)  ( 0.015)  ( 0.016)  ( 0.017) 
        
54βα   0.009  -1E-04   7E-04  -2E-04 
 ( 0.029)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.014) 
        
1δ  -0.019  -0.009  -0.012  -0.004 
 ( 0.057)  ( 0.019)  ( 0.023)  ( 0.024) 
        
2δ  -0.149  -0.014  -0.013  -0.021 
 ( 0.063)  ( 0.019)  ( 0.023)  ( 0.016) 
2R   0.36   0.90   0.90   0.90 
DW  1.88   1.46   1.47   1.43 
σ   0.93   0.70   0.70   0.70 
JB  2.34   10.1   9.64   7.81 
)( Jχ   1.76   2.87   2.87   2.99 
 ( 0.62)  ( 0.41)  ( 0.41)  ( 0.39) 
Table 5. Threshold Modell 3. Output Gap: NB , Inflation Measure: CPI-ATE. GMM estimates for period 
1993q1 - 2006q1. Standard errors are shown in brackets. No homogeneity restrictions made on the coefficients. 
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Testing instrument relevance can be done by the use of an auxiliary regression.  Preferably, 
this test should be performed regressing the endogenous explanatory variable on all 
exogenous and all instrumental variables. As expected inflation is not observable, this test is 
performed using the observed level of inflation as the endogenous variable: 
 
tttt u++=+ γδπ ZW4                                                  (25) 
 
 
tW is a (1×8) matrix representing the exogenous variables in equation (15) and the constant 
term. tZ is a (1×4) matrix representing the additional instruments used to correct the 
endogeneity problem. The coefficients in front of the instrumental variables ( γ ) should not be 
zero if the instruments are correlated with expected future inflation. Testing instrument 
relevance can thus be done by the following F-test: 
  
           
⎭⎬
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⎧
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1
0
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This test has low power as the expected rate of future inflation is not observable. A rule of 
thumb when checking for weak instruments says that if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, 
with an F-statistics well below 10, then the instrument set is poor. The F-statistic obtained 
using CPI-ATE is 0.78 with a p-value of 0.54, indicating that the instrument set used 
previously is weak.  
 
With respect to proper estimation of 1A, two natural questions arise: how sensitive are the 
estimates of 1A towards the choice of instrument set, and how to go about in finding an 
optimal set of instruments?  
 
Answering the first question, testing instrument sensitivity, can be done by removing one of 
the instrumental variables from the instrument set previously used. Not using the two period 
lag of inflation as an instrument, yields the following set of instruments: 
 
[ ]   7611 −−− ΔΔΔ= ttt qqqZ                                                  (26) 
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Table 6 provides the estimates when using this set of instruments. All coefficients are 
positive, which is in line with the calibrated values by NoB. The change of sign in some of the 
coefficients indicates that estimation is sensitive towards the choice of instrument set. 1Z does 
not pass the test of instrument relevance with an F-statistic well below 1. This indicates that 
one poor set of instruments has been replaced by another poor set of instruments. A more 
precise conclusion would thus be that estimation is sensitive towards poor choice of 
instrument sets.  
 
It is difficult to rationalise the choice of one of these set of instruments and not the other. 
Optimally, economic theory should underlie the choice of instrumental variables. The next 
section will use economic theory to rationalise why the variables included in the proposed 
instrument sets are thought to be correlated with the expected future rate of inflation.  
 
3.4.1 Expected Inflation and the Term Structure 
The expected future level of inflation can be related to the term structure of interest rates. 
Financing an investment can be done in two ways, both which should yield the same expected 
payoff. The investment can be financed by a long term loan, with n terms to maturity and a 
fixed interest rate per period equal to Fti . The total amount to be paid after n periods is then 
equal to nFti )1( + . Alternatively, it can be financed with short term debt. Assuming that the 
investor is risk neutral, the expected total amount to be paid after n periods equals the 
multiplication of current and expected future interest rates, given by the right hand side of 
(27):  
 
)1()1()1()1()1( 121 −+++ +×⋅⋅⋅×+×+×+=+ ntttttttnFt iEiEiEii                   (27) 
 
 
The possibility of arbitrage ensures that the expected value of the two means of financing 
should be equal. Taking logs on both sides, rearranging and using the definition of nominal 
interest rates 1++= tttt Eri π , (where ttttt ppEE −= ++ 11π ), yields: 
 
ntt
n
i
itt
F
t En
rE
n
i += +
∑ += π11
0
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Making the assumption that the real interest rate is constant, r , setting n=4, yields the 
following expression41:  
 
        4
1
++= ttFt Enri π                                                    (28) 
 
 
According to (28), any variation of the fixed four period interest rate, Fti , is caused by 
variation in the expected future level of inflation.  Fti  thus satisfies one of the criteria of good 
instruments: economic theory suggests that it is highly correlated with the expected rate of 
future inflation. The other criterion, that it is uncorrelated with the error term, is ensured by 
using a lagged value of the fixed interest rate. The following instrument set is thus defined: 
 
     1 12 −= tiZ          (29) 
 
Table (6) shows the estimation results using 2Z as instrument set.  The change of instrument 
set alters the sign of many of the coefficients with respect to previous estimates. In particular, 
the constant term and the estimate of the trade-off between inflation and production become 
negative. 
 
Testing the relevance of this instrument set, it is clearly rejected as an instrument which is 
highly correlated with future inflation. This test-result starkly contrasts the predictions of the 
economic rationale described above. It should be noted that two important assumptions were 
made when developing the relationship between Fti and 4+ttE π . First, investors were assumed 
to be risk neutral. Second, the real interest rate was assumed to be constant. If any of these 
assumptions are too strong, meaning that the variation in either risk premium or the real 
interest rate, tr , could account for the variation in the one year interest rate Fti , it could explain 
why 2Z failed the test as a valid instrument.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 ttttt ppEE −= ++ 44π  
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 1Z   2Z   3Z   NB 
0α   0.808   0.664   0.841  0,600 
 ( 0.189)  ( 0.119)  ( 0.064)   
        
πα1   0.343  -0.155   0.129  0,125 
 ( 0.215)  ( 0.156)  ( 0.122)   
        
)1( 10 αα −−   0.011   0.439   0.125  0,350 
 ( 0.317)  ( 0.159)  ( 0.073)   
        
2α    0.072  -0.022   0.072  0,070 
 ( 0.065)  ( 0.040)  ( 0.020)   
        
3α   0.026  -0.214  -0.145  0,100 
 ( 0.366)  ( 0.226)  ( 0.148)   
        
24βα   0.004  -0.039  -0.022  0,030 
 ( 0.019)  ( 0.016)  ( 0.013)   
        
34βα   0.038  -0.014   0.031  0,030 
 ( 0.019)  ( 0.016)  ( 0.011)   
        
44βα   0.014  -0.008   0.020  0,045 
 ( 0.020)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.012)   
        
54βα   0.005   0.010   0.020  0,045 
 ( 0.014)  ( 0.016)  ( 0.010)   
        
        
2R   0.90   0.87   0.89   
DW  1.44   1.39   1.59   
σ   0.70   0.70   0.70   
JB  13.8   4.58   69.4   
2
Jχ   2.27  Ø   5.42   
 ( 0.52)    ( 0.14)   
        
IVF  0.96  0.11  9.75   
(d.o.f) (3,39)  (1,41)  (5,36)   
Table 6. Instrument Sensitivity. GMM estimates for period 1993q1 - 2006q1. Standard errors are shown in 
brackets. No homogeneity restrictions made on the coefficients. 
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 Z   1Z   2Z   3Z  
1. order  0.15   0.08   0.02   0.29 
2. order  0.30   0.13   0.07   0.55 
3. order  0.42   0.24   0.08   0.75 
4. order  0.01   0.05   0.00   0.39 
5. order  0.01   0.08   0.00   0.50 
Table 7. Autocorrelation Test – Ljung-Box P values 0: 110 ==== kH ρρρ " . The Z column refers to the 
regression in Table 2 using CPI-ATE. The other columns relates to Table 6.   
 
3.4.2 Rational Expectation Hypothesis 
A second approach in developing an economic link between expected future inflation and an 
instrument set is the rational expectation hypothesis. Given that model 1A is the correct model 
for the economy, the rational expectation hypothesis states that people use all the available 
information to make the best possible forecasts of future inflation. In particular, all available 
information includes the structure of the economy as given by model 1A. More formally: 
 
[ ]144 −++ = tttt IEE ππ                                                     (30) 
 
The expectation of future inflation is based on the information set available at the end of 
period t-1 ( 1−tI ). This information set, as specified by model 1A, contains six variables in 
addition to the lagged variables already specified in the supply equation. Forming 
expectations about future inflation should according to the rational expectation hypothesis be 
done based on the additional information these variables provides. The additional set of 
instruments should thus contain these six variables: the nominal 3 month interest rate ( mi3 ), 
the real one year interest rate ( mr12  ), the real three year interest rate ( mr36 ), the nominal 
interest rate (   i ), the real exchange rate ( q ) and the foreign output gap ( Fygap ).  
 
[ ]       36  12  3 1111113 Ftt-t-t-t-t- ygap qimrmrmi −=Z                               (31) 
 
 
The estimation results using this instrument set is given in Table 6. In contrast to any of the 
other instrument sets, this is the only one which has not clearly been rejected as being 
relevant. Two coefficients are estimated with the wrong sign; however, neither of these 
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estimates is significantly different from zero.  The estimate of the output gap is clearly 
significant and identical to the calibrated value.  The estimates on past inflation, the inflation 
target and expected future inflation are close to the calibrated values, but insignificant.   
 
Table 7 provides the Ljung Box p-values of the autocorrelation test. The previous noted 
problem of autocorrelation of order four is not an issue using the instrument set based on the 
rational expectation hypothesis. The model predicts autocorrelation or order one. The 
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation cannot be significantly rejected. This could indicate 
that the coefficient in front of expected future inflation is zero. It could also be that the data 
material is not sufficient in determining the level of autocorrelation. The lack of evidence of 
autocorrelation is in this respect not evidence of lack of autocorrelation.  
 
3.5 Parameter Stability 
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Figure 28. Recursive estimation.  Instrument set Z . 95% confidence interval. Estimates on data from 1993q1 
ending 2000q2 to 2006q1. NB represents the calibrated value by Norges Bank.  
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This section will analyse how the estimates on 1AS varies over time. The analysis is based on 
recursive estimation where estimation is first done on the interval from 1993q1-2000q2. Then 
one quarter is added to the sample and the estimation is rerun on the sample from 1993q1 – 
2000q3. This procedure is repeated, by adding one quarter of data each time, until the whole 
data sample is reached (1993q1-2006q1). Testing parameter stability is done using two 
different instrument sets Z  and 3Z  
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Figure 29. Recursive estimation.  Instrument set 3Z . 95% confidence interval. Estimates on data from 
1993q1 ending 2000q2 to 2006q1. NB represents the calibrated value by Norges Bank.  
 
Recursive estimation illustrates how sensitive estimation is towards time period regardless of 
which instrument set is used. Many of the estimated parameters change significantly as more 
data is added. In addition, the calibrated values by Norges Bank are not within the 95% 
confidence intervals, which they should be if the model is well specified. Some variables even 
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show the wrong sign, indicating an opposite effect of what the model predicts, i.e. expected 
future inflation and the change in the real exchange rate.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Testing the core model which NoB uses in its forecasting of the Norwegian economy does not 
reject a linear shape of the supply curve. However, the empirical attributes of model 1A does 
not support its qualifications as a good economic model. The estimated parameters are highly 
sensitive towards choice of instrument set and time period of estimation. It should thus be 
noted that the linearity tests do not hold full power if the model is misspecified. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
NoB expresses a symmetrical property of the interest rate by the use of symmetrical fan 
charts. This thesis was concerned with the optimality of the symmetrical interest rate policy. 
Using a simple AS-AD model, it has been illustrated how the assumptions of a quadratic loss 
function and a linearised model of the economy underlies the optimality of symmetrical 
monetary policy. There are strong economic arguments against these simplifying 
assumptions, making the optimality of symmetrical fan charts questionable. Indeed, the 
market believes that uncertainty should be asymmetric (Figure 24). However, when testing 
the assumption of a linear aggregate supply curve, it could not be rejected on Norwegian data.  
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6 Appendix 
 
6.1 Data Description  
 
6.1.1 Main series 
 
CPI: Consumer Price Index (quarterly, unadjusted). FPAS_HIST: QUA_PCPI 
 
CPI-ATE: Consumer Price Index Adjusted for Taxes and Energy Prices. FPAS_HIST: 
QUA_PCPIJAE (quarterly, unadjusted) 
 
CPI-ATED: Consumer Price Index Domestic Sources. FPAS_HIST: QUA_PCPIJAEI 
(quarterly, unadjusted) 
 
NB: Output Gap. FPAS_HIST: QUA_GAP_Y (quarterly - note that the quarterly series is 
converted from annual series. Last 8 quarters is set by judgement to avoid end-of-series 
converting problem) 
 
REX: Real Exchange Rate. FPAS_HIST: QUA_QI44. The 44 countries included in the index 
with weights (per thousand) in parentheses are: Argentine (1.5), Austria (10.5), Australia 
(4.5), Bangladesh (0.6), Belgium (23.1), Brazil (5.3), Canada (19.4), Chile (1.4), China (22.7), 
Colombia (1.5), Czech Republic (3.0), Denmark (74.5), Finland (35.5), France (42.6), 
Germany (141.3), Great Britain (102.4), Greece (1.2), Hong Kong (4.9), Hungary (1.8), India 
(3.3), Indonesia (2.2), Ireland (13.0), Iceland (2.8), Italy (42.4), Japan (47.9), Malaysia (2.9), 
Morocco (1.0), Netherlands (46.3), Pakistan (1.2), Philippines (0.7), Poland (6.8), Portugal 
(8.2), Russia (18.3), Singapore (8.8), South Africa (2.2), South Korea (11.4), Spain (17.5), Sri 
Lanka (0.3), Switzerland (13.6), Sweden (165.2), Taiwan (7.6), Thailand (3.1), Turkey (3.4) 
and the USA (72.3). 
 
Series are available upon request.  
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6.1.2 Inflation 
 
The level of inflation can be measured by different means. Inflation is the increase in the 
overall level of prices. On quarterly data, the yearly inflation rate is given by: 
 
     )(100 4−−= ttt ppπ      (32) 
 
The price level42, p , are commonly measured by the consumer price index. The purpose of 
this index is to measure the increase in prices of goods typically consumed by households. 
The development of the inflation rate based on the consumer price index (CPI) is illustrated in 
Figure 30. Figure 30 also illustrates the development of two other inflation measures. One is 
the measure used by NB in its inflation targeting. This measure is based on the consumer 
price index adjusted for taxes and energy prices (CPI-ATE). The effects of taxes and energy 
are excluded as they are thought to be temporary only and thus difficult to control by 
monetary policy. The third inflation measure is based on the domestically driven price index 
adjusted for taxes and energy (CPI-ATED). The difference between CPI-ATE and CPI-ATED 
is thus the impact on inflation from imported goods.  
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Figure 30. Inflation. Quarterly data, seasonal adjusted 
 
                                                 
42 Denoted in natural logarithm 
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For testing purposes, the six years of experience with inflation targeting is a short period of 
time. However, the Norwegian economy has experienced low and stable inflation since the 
NOK was made floating after being pegged to the EURO’s precursor ECU in 1992. Equation 
1 is of this reason estimated on a sample period beginning the first quartile 1993. This is in 
accordance with Nymoen and Tveter’s estimation.  
 
 
6.1.3 The Output Gap  
 
ttt yyx −=        (33) 
 
The output gap, tx , is the percentage deviation between the actual level of production, ty , 
and the trend level of production , ty . There are great uncertainties associated with the output 
gap measure. Firstly, potential output ( ty ) is not directly observable and must be estimated. 
Such estimation is connected with a high degree of uncertainty. Alternative detrending 
methods can be used to arrive at the trend level of production. As there is no objectively 
correct value of the output gap this paper will analyse if the impact from using different 
detrending methods can explain the lack of theoretical consistency observed when estimating 
1AS.  The official output gap used by NoB makes the core output gap series in this analysis. 
Sensitivity towards the use of this series is analysed through the use of two other output gaps 
series, based on two different detrending methods.  The first part of this section will outline 
the rationale underlying these detrending methods and compare these data series with the 
official view of NoB. 
 
The second cause of output gap uncertainty relates to the measurement of the current state of 
the economy ( ty ).  Figures of national accounts are revised, often extensively. This 
uncertainty is often termed data uncertainty.  The second part of this section will illustrate the 
impact on the output gap due to data uncertainty.   
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Trend uncertainty - the Hodrick Prescott Filter HP 
 
The HP filter is a univariate method of detrending. The trend level of production is attained by 
minimising a weighted sum of the deviation of production from its trend level )( tt yy −  and 
the change in the trend growth rate )()( 11 −+ −−− tttt yyyy : 
 
       ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+−= ∑∑ −
=
−+
=
1
2
2
11
1
2 )()()(minarg
T
t
tttt
T
t
ttt yyyyyyy λ                    (34) 
 
The smoothing parameter, λ , provides the weight given to these conflicting objectives. In the 
extreme case whereλ =0, the trend level of production equals the actual level of production. 
In the opposite case, if weight is only given to minimising the change in the trend growth rate 
(λ  tend to infinity), the increase in the trend level becomes constant. No theoretical reasoning 
underlies the choice of the smoothing parameter. Hodrick and Prescott found that a value of 
the smoothing parameter λ =1600 gave a good fit on quarterly U.S. data. According to 
Norges Bank the smoothing parameter should be given a weight of 20000 to give a good fit 
on Norwegian quarterly data (Inflation Report 2/2004). Figure 31 illustrates the difference 
between the official view on the output gap by NoB (NB) and the output gap using the HP 
filter (HP) with a smoothing parameter of 20000. 
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Figure 31: The Output Gap (%). Official and HP-filtered. HP filtering on quarterly GDP at fixed prices  
(seasonally adjusted) (λ=20000). 
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In addition to the fact that there is no objectively correct value of the smoothing parameter, 
there are two further concerns when detrending using the HP filter. The first is the problem of 
imprecise estimates at the end points. It is caused by how the end of a time series does not 
hold information about the future. As the HP filter is two sided, and since it is constructed so 
as to minimise the change in trend growth, which includes the next period level of trend, the 
endpoints will be based on one side information only. Figure 31 illustrates a clear deviation 
between the official level of the output gap and the constructed HP series at the endpoints. 
The end point problem could explain this discrepancy. The second cause of concern is due to 
how the HP filter cannot immediately capture structural breaks in trends. A one-time shift in 
the trend level, caused by i.e. economic reforms, will only gradually be estimated by the HP 
filter as it assigns positive weight to minimising the change in the trend growth rate43.  
 
Trend Uncertainty - the Production Function Method  
 
The production function method (PF) of detrending is a multivariate method. It relies on the 
assumption that the level of production can be described by Cobb-Douglas technology and 
thus determined by the aggregate capital stock ( tk ), aggregate labour stock ( tl ), and total 
factor productivity ( ta ) (all variables are denoted in logs). Detrending these components in 
the production function yields the following expression for the trend level of production: 
 
tttt akly +++=   210 ζζζ                                                     (35) 
 
The upper bar denotes the trend levels. ζ ’s are constants. The trend levels of the capital 
stock, the total number of hours worked and total factor productivity is estimated by the use of 
HP-filter. Figure 32 compares the official output gap (NB) with the output gap retrieved when 
using the production function method of detrending44.  
                                                 
43 Bjørnland et al, 2006 
44 The data the production function method is the same as used by Bjørnland, et al.  A special thanks to Anne 
Sofie Jore for making this series available. 
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Figure 32: The Output Gap (%) – Official and PF-filtered. PF filtering on quarterly data. Data   
 
The advantage of the production function method is that it holds theoretical underpinnings. It 
is however subject to the same critique as the HP-filter since HP filtering is used in detrending 
the level of capital, number of hours worked and total factor productivity (Bjørnland et al). In 
addition, it restricts technology to follow a Cobb-Douglas form, which may be a strong 
assumption.  
 
Data Uncertainty 
 
Figures of the national account are often revised. Figure 33 illustrates the output gap between 
1993q1 and 2002q1 based on information in 2002q1 and 2006q1.  Both series are detrended 
by the same method, using HP-filter with a smoothing parameter of 20000.  
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Figure 33: Output Gap – Different Information sets.  Quarterly data, unadjusted.  
 
There are clear discrepancies between the levels of the output gap depending on what 
information set is used to create the output gap series. At some years, i.e. 1998, the two series 
show different sign of the output gap. Figure 33 thus illustrates that there is great uncertainty 
surrounding the output gap depending on which information set it is based upon. This paper 
will analyse how this uncertainty impacts the estimates of 1AS. 
 
6.1.4 The Real Exchange Rate  
 
The real exchange rate indicator used is I-44. The nominal exchange rate underlying the real 
exchange rate is based on a weighting of Norway’s 44 most important trading partners45. The 
foreign consumer price level is based on a weighting of 25 of the 44 most important trading 
partners. Figure 34 illustrates the development of the real exchange rate.  
 
                                                 
45 See Appendix 6.1.1 
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Figure 34: The Real Exchange Rate – I44– quarterly data 
  
Using I-44 as the real exchange rate indicator may cause biased estimates. The calibrated 
coefficients of the change in the real exchange rate were based on available empirical 
evidence. In particular, the calibration was influenced by empirical findings on the pass 
through from exchange rate changes to prices. The foreign price index, of which I-44 is based 
upon, will not necessarily illustrate foreign inflation on imported consumption goods. This is 
due to how imported goods differ from the goods which make up this index. In addition, this 
index does not reflect changes caused by a changing import pattern from high- to low-cost 
countries. In turn, foreign prices could thus explain more of the observed level of deflation on 
imported goods than assumed only using foreign price indexes. As the real exchange rate is 
based upon foreign price indexes, the real exchange rate explains less of the observed 
deflation on imported goods than previously assumed (IR. 1/2004). This empirical 
observation was taken into account when calibrating the model. Estimating the supply curve 
using I-44 as the exchange rate indicator will not take this effect into account. The estimates 
will thus be biased. The size of the bias, however, is uncertain. It is affected by the weight 
assigned to the new empirical evidence on the exchange rate pass-through, and how the 
change in the exchange rate pass-through is thought to impact the supply side of the economy. 
These issues are not further discussed in the model documentation.  
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6.2 Output Gap Sensitivity  
 
Uncertainty relating to the output gap can be caused by which detrending method is used and 
what information the measure of production is based upon.  This section will analyse these 
two uncertainties separately.  
 
6.2.1 Trend uncertainty 
 
Table 8 provides estimates when using the three alternative detrending methods: the official 
output gap by NoB (NB), detrending using the HP-filter (HP) and detrending using the 
production function method (PF). The fourth column provides the calibrated values in model 
1A (NB-CAL).  
 
The significance of lagged inflation and the three period lag of the change in the real 
exchange rate are robust to a change in the output gap measure. The estimated coefficient of 
the output gap does not hold the same robustness and it becomes insignificantly different from 
zero when using HP and PF. Even though insignificant, it does hold the correct sign for all 
detrending methods. The same does not apply for the change in the output gap. Its estimated 
coefficient is consistently estimated with the wrong sign for all output gap measures. Neither 
of these estimates however is significantly different from zero. 
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 NB  HP  PF  NB-CAL 
0α   0.732   0.810   0.826  0,600 
 ( 0.105)  ( 0.078)  ( 0.090)   
        
*1πα   0.247   0.233   0.175  0,125 
 ( 0.118)  ( 0.190)  ( 0.175)   
        
)1( 10 αα −−   0.154   0.080   0.100  0,350 
 ( 0.143)  ( 0.168)  ( 0.175)   
        
2α    0.048   0.035   0.024  0,070 
 ( 0.025)  ( 0.041)  ( 0.031)   
        
3α  -0.114  -0.037  -0.016  0,100 
 ( 0.213)  ( 0.022)  ( 0.018)   
        
24βα  -0.003   0.008   0.003  0,030 
 ( 0.017)  ( 0.016)  ( 0.018)   
        
34βα   0.025   0.035   0.032  0,030 
 ( 0.014)  ( 0.018)  ( 0.016)   
        
44βα   0.005   0.014   0.011  0,045 
 ( 0.015)  ( 0.021)  ( 0.022)   
        
54βα   0.002  -0.001   0.003  0,045 
 ( 0.013)  ( 0.016)  ( 0.016)   
        
        
2R   0.90   0.89   0.89   
DW  1.46   1.50   1.51   
σ   0.70   0.70   0.70   
JB  8.81   6.61   5.36   
)( Jχ   2.86   2.39   2.46   
 ( 0.41)  ( 0.49)  ( 0.48)   
Table 8: Estimates for model 1AS Output Gap variable Output Gap variable: NB, HP, PF. Note: GMM 
estimates for period 1993q1 - 2006q1. Standard errors are shown in brackets. No restrictions made on the 
coefficients. The estimated equations include two lags of inflation, lagged output gap, lagged change in output 
gap and seven lags of the change in the real exchange rate. CPI, CPI-ATE and CPI-ATED refers to different 
inflation measures.  
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Table 9 provides the Ljung-Box p values of the autocorrelation test. Autocorrelation of order 
1, which the model predicts, is significant using all detrending methods. Autocorrelation of 
order 4 and 5 is also significant using all detrending methods, in contrast to the predictions of 
the model.  
 
 NB  HP  PF 
1. Order   0.09   0.12   0.12 
2. Order  0.16   0.12   0.19 
3. Order  0.28   0.24   0.34 
4. Order  0.01   0.02   0.01 
5. Order  0.01   0.03   0.02 
               Table 9: Autocorrelation Test – Ljung-Box P values 0: 110 ==== kH ρρρ "  
 
 
6.2.2 Data Uncertainty 
 
This section will analyse the impact of data uncertainty on the estimates of the short run trade-
off between inflation and production. The period of estimation is 1993q1 – 2002q1. Over this 
sample period the data are continuously revised from 2002q1 – 2006q1 (2004q2 and 2004q4 
are missing). Figure 35 illustrates how the estimates on the trade-off between production and 
inflation, v,2αˆ , change as the data is revised.  The subscript v denotes vintage, meaning that 
the period of estimation (1993q1 – 2002q1) is held constant.  
 
The estimates vary extensively, from the lowest estimate in 03q1 of 0.055 to the highest in 
2004q3 of 0.138. The error bars provides a 95% confidence interval around the point 
estimates of v,2αˆ . The calibrated value used by NB, represented by the solid line, is always 
within the 95% confidence interval. Figure 36 thus indicates that the calibrated value by NB is 
robust towards updated information on the output gap.  
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Figure 35. Output Gap Sensitivity – Data Uncertainty. GMM point estimates for period 1993q1 - 2002q1 
using real time data from 2002q1 – 2006q1. 95% confidence intervals. 2004q2 and 2004q4 are missing.  No 
restrictions made on the coefficients. The estimated equations include two lags of inflation, lagged output gap, 
lagged change in output gap and seven lags of the change in the real exchange rate. CPI-ATE and HP-
QuarterlyM46 are the respective inflation and production measures.  
 
 
 
The estimation results reported in Table 8 and Table 9 does not indicate that the choice of 
output gap measure can explain the observed empirical inconsistency. The autocorrelation 
problem remains regardless of output gap measure and many of the variables provides 
estimates that are not significantly different from zero.  
 
6.3 The regulation on monetary policy 
(http://www.dep.no/filarkiv/132945/regnorgesbank.pdf) 
 
Established by Royal Decree of 29 March 2001 pursuant to Section 2, third paragraph, and 
Section 4, second paragraph, of the Act of 24 May 1985 no. 28 on Norges Bank and the 
Monetary System 
 
I 
 
                                                 
46 HP-QuarterlyM is obtained by data on GDP mainland at fixed prices with HP detrending using λ =20000. 
v
tv ,2ˆˆ 05.0,25,2 ασα ± NBv,2αˆ  
v,2αˆ  
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§ 1. 
 
Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and 
international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate 
developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing 
to stable developments in output and employment. 
 
Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. Norges Bank’s 
implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the first paragraph, be oriented 
towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy shall be annual 
consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. 
 
In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, 
excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account. 
 
§ 2. 
 
Norges Bank shall regularly publish the assessments that form the basis for the 
implementation of monetary policy. 
 
§ 3. 
 
The international value of the Norwegian krone is determined by the exchange rates in the 
foreign exchange market. 
 
§ 4. 
 
On behalf of the State, Norges Bank communicates the information concerning the exchange 
rate system ensuing from its participation in the International Monetary Fund, cf. Section 
25,first paragraph, of the Act on Norges Bank and the Monetary System. 
 
II 
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This regulation comes into force immediately. Regulation no. 0331 of 6 May 1994 on the 
exchange rate system for the Norwegian krone is repealed from the same date. 
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6.4 Deriving the Optimal Interest rate Rule 
 
6.4.1 The Model 
 
Loss function:  22 )()( ππλ −+−= ttt yyL  
AS:    tttt uyy +−+= − )(1 αππ  
AD:    tttt viyy +−−=− − )( 1πϕ  
 
6.4.2 The Derivation 
  ASs.t    
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,
t
y
L
tt π             ⇒          
tttt
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The Lagrangian (V ) gives: 
 
( )tttttt uyyyyV .)()()( 122 −−−−−−+−= − αππθππλ  
 
This yields the following first order conditions: 
 
I.    0)(2 =+−=∂
∂ θαλ yy
y
V
t
t
 
 
II.   0)(2 =−−=∂
∂ θπππ tt
V
 
 
Together these give the first order condition for the optimal policy, or the optimal AD curve: 
 
)( yytt −−= α
λππ  
 
Inserting this into the AD relationship, solving for ti , gives the nominal interest rate that must 
be set to achieve the optimal solution at different levels of inflation: 
 
 
tttt vi ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+= − ϕππϕλ
απ 1)(1  
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6.5 Deriving the optimal interest rate with the linex loss function 
6.5.1 The Model 
 
Loss function:  22
)(
)(
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AS:    tttt uyy +−+= − )(1 αππ  
AD:    tttt viyy +−−=− − )( 1πϕ  
 
6.5.2 The Derivation 
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The Lagrangian (V ) gives: 
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This yields the following first order conditions: 
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Together these give the first order condition for the optimal policy: 
 
)1()( )( ππββλ
α −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=− teyyt  
 
Inserting this into the AD curve, solving for ti , gives the nominal interest rate that must be 
set to achieve the optimal solution at different levels of inflation: 
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6.6 Deriving the optimal interest rate with recession aversion 
6.6.1 The Model 
 
Loss function:  ⎪⎭
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6.6.2 The Derivation 
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A) If  yyt > : 
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The optimal interest rate is thus independent of the current inflation rate.  
 
 
 
 
B) If  yyt < : derivation follows from the main model, which gives: 
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6.7 Deriving the optimal interest rate with non-linear AS curve 
 
6.7.1  The Model 
 
Loss function:  22 )()( ππλ −+−= ttt yyL  
AS:    ttttt uyyy ++−+= − 21 )( ηαππ  
AD:    tttt viyy +−−=− − )( 1πϕ  
 
6.7.2 The Derivation 
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The Lagrangian (V ) gives: 
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This yields the following first order conditions: 
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Together these give the first order condition for the optimal policy: 
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Inserting this into the AD curve, solving for ti , gives the nominal interest rate that must be 
set to achieve the optimal solution at different levels of inflation: 
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6.8 The Simultaneity problem 
 
Given the system of equations: 
 
(1)  444 +++ += ttttE υππ  
(2)       ∑
=
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2
41312410110 )1(
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Inserting (1) into (2) gives: 
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Which implies endogeneity: 
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6.9 Welfare costs of consumption fluctuations 
 
The value of all that is produced in an economy is the real income of the economy. When 
there is variation in the amount that is produced, there will also be variation in the real 
income, which again will lead to variation in consumption, i.e. if real income decreases, 
consumption will also decrease. The marginal utility of consumption is assumed to be 
negative, i.e. a consumer will feel greater pleasure from the first ice-cream he eats on a warm 
summer day, than what the level of added pleasure will be if he decides to eat a second one. 
The assumption of decreasing marginal utility leads thus to consumers wanting to smooth 
their consumption path, i.e. during a one week summer holiday it is better to enjoy one ice-
cream a day, than seven the first day, and none the rest of the holiday. Enjoying one ice-cream 
a day gives the least variation in consumption. If monetary policies can effectively stabilise 
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the level of production, and thus the level of consumption, it would therefore improve the 
welfare of the consumer47.  
 
 
 
6.10 Choosing an inflation target 
 
Mr. Gjedrem wanted a 2% inflation target in 2001 when the mandate was changed. The 
government however, went for a 2.5% target after the major union LO had given its approval. 
Mr. Gjedrem believed that this target was too high. (DN, 20.06.2001). The economic rationale 
when deciding on an inflation target is the topic of this section.  
 
As previously discussed, inflation in itself is costly to society due to factors such as Shoe-
leather costs, menu costs, relative price distortions, etc. These costs are reduced if the level of 
inflation is reduced. It is therefore optimal to set the inflation target as low as possible. At a 
zero percent inflation rate, these costs of inflation would be non-existent. There is however 
strong arguments against a zero percent inflation target. 
 
First, if the inflation target were zero percent, the risk of the economy going into a liquidity 
trap (deflation) would be severe. Due to the huge costs and difficulties of stabilising inflation 
when experiencing deflation, it is important to avoid the possibility of liquidity traps.   
 
Second, most economies have the property of so called downward nominal wage rigidity. 
Simplified, this means that employees, and their unions, are reluctant to accept a cut in the 
nominal wage. If inflation is positive, and employees accept that their nominal wage is held 
constant, then they are actually accepting a wage cut, in real terms. Some degree of inflation 
can thus be beneficial, so as to create flexibility in the labour market.  
 
Third, price indices tend to overstate the true rate of inflation. In a report by an Advisory 
Commission to the U.S. senate in 1996 found that “the U.S. consumer price index 
overestimates inflation by 1.1 percentage points a year” (Lequiller, 1997, p.1). This 
                                                 
47 The debate of whether capital markets can be effectively used to smooth consumption when production varies 
is omitted. The purpose of the paragraph is to give the reader an economic rationale to why variation in 
production can be costly to society.   
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overestimation was mostly caused by the difficulties of measuring the effect of new products 
entering the market (ibid). Another problem with price indices is how to exclude the 
temporary effects on the consumer price index (CPI) that does not impact the development of 
inflation over time. In April 2006 the CPI increased 3.8% from the previous year. This 
increase was strongly impacted by the rapid change in price levels of gas and electricity. Gas 
and electricity represents goods which prices are highly variable, a variation the central bank 
cannot control. Excluding gas and electricity prices, controlling for taxes (CPI-ATE), gave a 
core inflation rate of 2.5%. According to the central bank governor, one should be cautious 
when judging core inflation based on CPI-ATE as it most likely overestimates the effect of 
gas and electricity. The reason for this is twofold. First, Norges Bank assumes that the tax 
increase only impacts consumers. In reality, however, it is likely that the effect of a tax 
increase is shared between consumers and producers, depending on the price sensitivity of 
supply and demand. Second, the increase in gas and electricity prices is probably not just 
caused by temporary factors, but they are also likely to be caused by other, more lasting 
factors (Gjedrem, 7. June. 2006). These lasting shocks should not be excluded by the price 
index since they impact the trend development of inflation, which is what the central bank 
wants to control. As price indices tend to overestimate the true inflation rate, the central bank 
should not try to target a zero percent inflation rate. Doing so would effectively be a deflation 
target.  
 
The costs related to inflation moves in favour of an inflation target as low as possible. Risks 
of deflation, downwards nominal rigidity and the problem of price indices overestimating 
inflation are factors that show the advantage of having some level of trend inflation in the 
economy. The above discussion provides some reasoning to why the inflation target should 
not be as high as 10% or 15%. But it has not showed why one should choose an inflation 
target of 2% and not 2.5%, which was what the central bank governor Gjedrem wanted. 
Obviously, he believed that 2% was more than sufficient to deal with the risks of deflation, 
downwards nominal rigidity and overestimating price indices. Mr. Gjedrem was not alone on 
his position. Other inflation targeting countries, such as Canada, Israel, UK and Sweden focus 
on achieving lower than 2.5% inflation. Some of these countries however do not have explicit 
targets, but their policy is aimed at keeping inflation within a band of e.g. 1 – 3 %. The 
policies of the different inflation targeting countries can be seen from Figure 6.  
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Figure 36. Inflation targets in countries with inflation targeting. Per cent. (Gjedrem, 7 June 2005) 
 
Many countries focus on achieving a low level of inflation. 15 of the 20 inflation targeting 
countries aims at always keeping inflation lower than 4%. Brazil, Columbia, South Africa, 
Hungary and the Philippines however, seem to allow for a bit more inflation. The different 
aims of monetary policy amongst inflation targeting countries raise a natural question:  Does 
economic literature not give a precise answer to where an inflation target should be, or is it 
the specific economic structure of each country that makes different inflation targets optimal? 
The short answer is that it is a bit of both. 
 
Economists disagree about what the optimal inflation target is. They even disagree whether or 
not one should have an inflation target (Mankiw, 2000). As the previous discussion 
illustrated, economic literature states that there are costs related to inflation, and one should 
try to minimise these costs. Norway is however in somewhat of a unique situation. The 
country enjoys great wealth from its oil and gas extraction, and this wealth will be gradually 
phased into the economy. One could thus argue that a higher inflation target allows for a bit 
more flexibility when in the process of enjoying this wealth. This is due to how wealth 
consumption puts pressure on the domestic inflation rate.   
 
In an on-line question-and-answer session on Norwegian financial news dn.no, Mr. Gjedrem 
toned down the importance of where an inflation target should be. In response to a question of 
why Norway sat its inflation target to 2.5%, and not 2% which is the target rate at Sveriges 
Rigsbank and the European Central Bank, he answered: “The government sets the target rate. 
The 2.5% target was based on the fact that Norway experienced a 2.5% inflation rate during 
the nineties. Adding to that, England and some other countries did have a 2.5 % target at that 
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time. Whether the inflation target is 2.5% or 2% is not of great significance” (Gjedrem, 
2006)48.   
 
                                                 
48 Authors own translation of: ”Det er regjeringen som setter målet. Bakgrunnen for 2,5 % var at vi hadde hatt en 
inflasjon på 2,5% på 90-tallet. Dessuten hadde England og enkelte andre land et mål på 2,5% den gangen. Det 
betyr ikke mye om vi har et mål på 2,5% eller 2%” 
 
